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INTRODUCTION
"Maybe I'm just naive."'
* Professor of Law and Director, Center for Ethics and Public Service, University of Miami School
of Law. @ 2006, Anthony V. Alfieri. Earlier versions of this Article were presented in faculty workshops
at the University of Georgia Law School, the Florida International University College of Law, and the
Washington & Lee University School of Law. I am grateful to Gerald Backman, Adrian Barker, Naomi
Cahn, Bob Gordon, Ellen Grant, Amelia Hope, Peter Margulies, JoNel Newman, Mitt Regan, Rob
Rosen, Tom Shaffer, Bill Simon, Frank Valdes, and faculty workshop participants for their comments
and support.
I also wish to thank Carolina de Posada, Mark Rooney, Robin Schard, Kelley Spencer, Brette Wolff,
and the University of Miami School of Law library staff for their research assistance, as well as Lindsay
Amstutz, Dan Staroselsky, and the editorial staff of The Georgetown Law Journal.
This Essay is dedicated to the students, teachers, and friends of the Center for Ethics & Public
Service in celebration of its 10th Anniversary. Since 1996, the Center has trained over 400 fellows and
interns; educated over 13,000 members of the Florida bar, bench, law school, university, and civic
communities; and dedicated more than 100,000 student hours to public service.
1. MILTON C. REGAN, JR., EAT WHAT You KILL: THE FALL OF A WALL STREET LAWYER 368 (2004)
(quoting David Goelzer, general counsel for the Bucyrus-Erie Corporation).
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Ten years ago, the University of Miami School of Law started an interdiscipli-
nary clinic, the Center for Ethics & Public Service, dedicated to the mission of
educating and training law students in ethical judgment, professional responsibil-
ity, and community service. The Center established three guiding principles to
achieve that mission: university-wide, cross-disciplinary collaboration; public-
private partnership; and leadership mentoring.2 Last fall I announced to a new
crop of clinical students that our course on Ethics and Public Service would no
longer solely emphasize ethics and professional responsibility. Instead, I ex-
plained, we would stress lawyer malpractice, loss prevention, and professional
liability. The legal profession and its regulation under the law of lawyering, I
continued, had changed. To understand this regulatory shift, I insisted, we
would turn greater attention to the assessment and management of risk. In the
new century, risk management would triumph.
Doubtless, veteran teachers of legal ethics and professional responsibility will
recognize my opening classroom remarks as a kind of pedagogic gambit, an
attempt to seize student attention and overturn settled expectation. To my initial
surprise, and ultimate consternation, the gambit worked, evolving from a useful
heuristic tool into a comprehensive framework readily adopted by students to
rationalize the field of lawyer regulation. When I shared this gambit anecdotally
with academics and practitioners in the field, neither experienced ethics teachers
nor seasoned professional liability lawyers seemed surprised by the student
reaction. Both groups acknowledged the growing embrace of risk management
in the regulatory norms and narratives of the legal profession. A quick glance at
the casebooks, conferences, and practice materials across the field confirms this
widening embrace. Academic and media accounts, particularly reports of
contemporary corporate scandals,4 verify its expanding hold.
The purpose of this Essay is to explore the normative implications of that
embrace for lawyers, law firms, and professional regulation. The thesis of the
Essay is that the widespread adoption of risk management mechanisms (for
example, in-house advisors and internal controls, outside consultants and exter-
nal audits, conflicts of interest protocols, and continuing legal education train-
ing) actually diminishes the appreciation of the moral choices facing lawyers in
practice and the other-regarding obligations of lawyers in society. Indeed, the
2. The Center emphasizes both faculty-student and student-to-student mentoring and leadership
training tailored to encourage law reform initiatives and non-profit ventures. See Anthony V. Alfieri,
Teaching Ethics/Doing Justice, 73 FoRDHAM L. REV. 851, 857-62 (2004) (describing the mission and
history of the Center for Ethics & Public Service).
3. National conferences annually addressing risk management in the legal profession include the
American Bar Association Center for Professional Responsibility National Conference on Professional
Responsibility, the Legal Malpractice & Risk Management Conference, and the Association for
Professional Responsibility Lawyers Conferences.
4. For a discussion of current and previous corporate scandals, see generally LOREN Fox, ENRON: THE
RISE AND FALL (2002); KENNETH R. GRAY, LARRY A. FRIEDER & GEORGE W. CLARK, JR., CORPORATE
SCANDALS: THE MANY FACES OF GREED (2005); BeHANY McLEAN & PETER ELKIND, THE SMARTEST GuYs
IN THE Room: THE AMAZING RISE AND ScANDALous FALL OF ENRON (2003).
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technology of risk assessment and regulation, implemented through internally
and externally prescribed policies,5 subtly discounts the daily necessity of moral
discretion and the constant calling of public obligation. As a result, lawyers and
law firms underestimate the burdens of moral agency in the discretionary
decisionmaking of advocacy and counseling. Equally important, they neglect
the duties of social responsibility to clients, third parties, and the public. In sum,
they discard the highest ambitions of professionalism displayed in traditions of
independence, service, and trust.
Both moral discretion and other-regarding obligations figure prominently in
the work of Milton Regan6 and William Simon.7 Leading voices in the field of
modern legal ethics and lawyer regulation, Regan and Simon recently contrib-
uted two significant books to the literature on the profession: Regan's Eat What
You Kill: The Fall of a Wall Street Lawyer8 and Simon's The Practice of
Justice: A Theory of Lawyers' Ethics.9 The books erect helpful theoretical and
contextual frameworks for the analysis of lawyers and law firms in contempo-
rary corporate practice. This Essay draws on, and sympathetically extends, their
current work on legal ethics in the large law firm setting of corporate law.'o In
this way, it lays the groundwork for a more sustained study of the hazards and
safeguards of risk management and professional liability in law and society.
The Essay is divided into five parts. Part I describes the 1994 fall of John
Gellene-a thirty-seven-year-old bankruptcy partner at the venerable Wall Street
law firm of Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy ("Milbank")-under the weight
of a federal criminal prosecution for making false declarations in a high-stakes
corporate bankruptcy proceeding." Part II links Gellene's fall to the fraying
5. Here, the internal/external distinction turns on the source of the risk management technique.
Internal sources stem from lawyer and law firm self-regulation. External sources spring from malprac-
tice insurance carriers outside the firm.
6. For an overview of Regan's work on the large law firm and corporate practice, see Milton C.
Regan, Jr., Corporate Norms and Contemporary Law Firm Practice, 70 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 931
(2002); Milton C. Regan, Jr., Ethics, Law Firms, and Legal Education, 55 ME. L. REv. 363 (2003);
Milton C. Regan, Jr., Foreword: Professional Responsibility and the Corporate Lawyer, 13 GEO. J.
LEGAL Enics 197 (2000); Milton C. Regan, Jr., Taking Law Firms Seriously, 16 GEo. J. LEGAL Enics
155 (2002).
7. For Simon's recent writing on the ethics of corporate law practice, see William H. Simon, Whom
(Or What) Does the Organization's Lawyer Represent?: An Anatomy ofIntraclient Conflict, 91 CAL. L.
REV. 57 (2003); William H. Simon, Wrongs of Ignorance and Ambiguity: Lawyer Responsibility for
Collective Misconduct, 22 YALE J. ON REG. 1 (2005).
8. See REGAN, supra note 1.
9. WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JusricE: A THEORY OF LAWYERS' Enucs (1998). For appraisals,
see Rob Atkinson, Lawyering in Law's Republic, 85 VA. L. REv. 1505 (1999) (reviewing WILLIAM H.
SIMON, THE PRAcrcE OF JusTicE: A THEORY OF LAWYERS' Enucs (1998)); Symposium, The Practice of
Justice by William H. Simon, 51 STAN. L. REv. 867 (1999).
10. For the purposes of this Essay, large law firms will be defined broadly to include multi-office,
multi-state, and multi-national firms in excess of 260 lawyers. See Am Law 200: A Guide to Our
Methodology, AM. LAW., Aug. 1, 2005 (noting the average size of The Am Law 200's Second Hundred
law firms at 260 lawyers).
11. For commentary on the prosecution, see Steven M. Biskupic, A Criminal Prosecution for
Violating Bankruptcy Rule 2014: A Strong Standard or Simply Strong Proof?, 9 J. BANKR. L. & PRAc.
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connection between legal ethics and the classical norms of the profession and
moral community. Part III traces the rise of risk management norms in lawyer
regulation and law firm organization, tracking the development of risk-
controlling norms in law and society, and their flawed application in the instant
case. Part IV offers a critique of risk management from the perspective of
discretionary norms, highlighting ethical and management deficiencies in the
conduct of the Milbank corporate bankruptcy team. Part V considers the revival
of accountability and compliance norms in the resurgent regulation of corporate
practice. The Essay concludes with a discussion of the jurisprudential and
practical significance of risk management norms within the regulatory traditions
of the legal profession.
I. THE FALL OF JOHN GELLENE
"How had he fallen so far so fast?" 12
This Part documents the fall of John Gellene, culling from the detailed
account of his misconduct in Regan's fascinating case history of corporate
law-in-action in Eat What You Kill. Gellene's fall comes during a new era of
financial scandals engulfing not only corporations and their accountants, bank-
ers, directors, and officers, but also lawyers, financial advisors, lobbyists, and
law firms. This era, here roughly bounded by the federal administrative sanction-
ing of the New York law firm Kaye Scholer13 in 1992 and the bankruptcy of the
corporate titan Enron in 2001,14 coincides with the historical transformation and
sociological reorganization of the large law firm.1 5
301 (2000); Peter J. Henning, Targeting Legal Advice, 54 AM. U. L. REv. 669, 685-86 (2005); Charles
W. Wolfram, Lawyer Crimes: Beyond the Law?, 36 VAL. U. L. REv. 73, 78 & n.16 (2001).
12. REGAN, supra note 1, at 12.
13. For helpful accounts of the federal investigation and punishment of Kaye Scholer, see Anthony
E. Davis, The Long-Tenn Implications of the Kaye Scholer Case for Law Firm Management-Risk
Management Comes of Age, 35 S. Thx. L. Rav. 677 (1994); Robert W. Gordon, A Collective Failure of
Nerve: The Bar's Response to Kaye Scholer, 23 LAW & Soc. INQURY 315 (1998); William H. Simon,
The Kaye Scholer Affair: The Lawyer's Duty of Candor and the Bar's Temptations of Evasion and
Apology, 23 LAW & Soc. INQumRY 243 (1998); David B. Wilkins, Making Context Count: Regulating
Lawyers After Kaye, Scholer, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1145 (1993). See also James 0. Johnston, Jr. & Daniel
Scott Schecter, Introduction: Kaye, Scholer and the OTS-Did Anyone Go Too Far?, 66 S. CAL. L. REV.
977 (1993); Ted Schneyer, From Self-Regulation to Bar Corporatism: What the S&L Crisis Means for
the Regulation of Lawyers, 35 S. Thx. L. REv. 639 (1994).
14. For evaluations of lawyer conduct in the Enron case, see John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding
Enron: "It's About the Gatekeepers, Stupid," 57 Bus. LAW. 1403 (2002); Roger C. Cramton, Enron and
the Corporate Lawyer: A Primer on Legal and Ethics Issues, 58 Bus. LAW. 143 (2002); Robert W.
Gordon, A New Role for Lawyers?: The Corporate Counselor After Enron, 35 CoNN. L. REv. 1185
(2003); Susan P. Koniak, Corporate Fraud: See, Lawyers, 26 HARv. J.L. & PuB. PoL'Y 195 (2003);
Donald C. Langevoort, The Organizational Psychology of Hyper-competition: Corporate Irresponsibil-
ity and the Lessons of Enron, 70 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 968 (2002); William H. Widen, Enron at the
Margin, 58 Bus. LAW. 961 (2003). See also ENRON: CORPORATE FIAscos AND THEIR IMPLiCATIONs (Nancy
B. Rapoport & Bala G. Dharan eds., 2004) (collection of essays).
15. The recent literature on lawyer regulation highlights the importance of the culture and structure
of large law firms. See Robert W. Gordon, The Ethical Worlds of Large-Firm Litigators: Preliminary
1912 [Vol. 96:1909
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Regan's account of Gellene and Milbank proceeds against the backdrop of
the changing role of lawyers, law firms, and legal ethics in corporate and
bankruptcy practice. The focal points for this penetrating account are the
cultural and socioeconomic forces that shape practice in the large Wall Street
law firm and thus inform both professional ideals and ethical ambitions. To
gauge the strength of these cultural and socioeconomic forces, Regan dissects
the partner tournament at Milbank, the norms of transactional lawyers in large
firms, and the moral universe constructed by elite teams of specialists within
corporate and bankruptcy law.16
Regan's contextual study responds to the growing call for practice-based
treatments of lawyers' work.'7 To mount his narrative-driven case study, Regan
conducted an extensive investigation, including interviews with corporate and
bankruptcy lawyers, investment bankers, and financial advisors well-versed in
the corporate restructuring of financially distressed companies. The locus of that
investigation was the bankruptcy of the Bucyrus-Erie Corporation (hereinafter
"Bucyrus"), a long-standing Wisconsin mining tool manufacturer. Regan docu-
ments the history of Bucyrus, sketching its economic condition, leveraged
buyout, post-buyout financial transactions, and reorganization plan.'" From that
initial historical rendering, he sketches the Bucyrus bankruptcy filing, disclosure
trial, and fee hearing. Together these vibrant sketches form the landscape for the
subsequent federal criminal investigation, prosecution, and trial of John Gellene.
A. HISTORY AND SOCIOLOGY OF THE LARGE LAW FIRM
Regan explores the broader significance of the Gellene criminal prosecution
for the history and sociology of large law firm practice in American society.
Alert to the "distinct practice cultures" within large law firms, Regan discerns
specialty-specific "norms and understandings of ethical obligations" attendant
to particular types of organizations and fields of practice.1' These norms and
undestandings, he explains, help determine "how lawyers identify, frame, and
resolve ethical questions" within law firms, practice groups, and litigation or
transactional "deal" teams.2 0 Accordingly, he urges sensitivity to the differential
Observations, 67 FORDHAM L. REv. 709 (1998); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. & Ted Schneyer, Regulatory
Controls on Large Law Firms: A Comparative Perspective, 44 AIz. L. REV. 593 (2002); Robert L.
Nelson, Ideology, Practice, and Professional Autonomy: Social Values and Client Relationships in the
Large Law Firm, 37 STAN. L. REV. 503 (1985); Randall S. Thomas, Stewart J. Schwab & Robert G.
Hansen, Megafirms, 80 N.C. L. REv. 115 (2001).
16. See REGAN, supra note 1, at 37-42.
17. See id. at 4 (remarking that "case studies can be an especially valuable way to deepen our
understanding of the complex interaction between context and individual character"). For useful recent
studies of private practice, see JOHN P. HEINz ET AL., URBAN LAWYERS: THE NEw SocIAL STRuCruRE OF
THE BAR (2005); MicHAEL J. KELLY, LIvEs OF LAwYERs: JoURNEYS IN THE ORGANIZATIONS OF PRACTICE
(1994); CARROLL SERON, THE BusINEss OF PRACrICING LAW: THE WORK LivEs OF SOLO AND SMALL-FIRM
ArroRNEYs (1996).
18. See REGAN, supra note 1, at 71-94.
19. Id. at 4.
20. Id.
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"incentives, opportunities, and pressures" confronting lawyers in large law
firms. 21
Regan begins his exploration with a deftly distilled history and sociology of
the large law firm from the late nineteenth century to the early twenty-first
century.22 He ties the emergence of the large law firm to the nineteenth century
industrialization of the American economy, particularly the post-Civil War era
of railroad, oil, coal, and steel enterprises. To Regan, the scale and scope of
those enterprises, coupled with the 1870 creation of the Interstate Commerce
Commission and the 1890 passage of the Sherman Antitrust Act, "strained the
boundaries of existing organizational forms, legal rules, and capital markets"
giving rise to the need for "coordinated, intensive, and ongoing legal services"
beyond the ken of solo and small firm practitioners beset by increasing over-
head costs (e.g., library, telephone, and typewriter) and limited economies of
scale.2 3 Despite this expanding need, Regan notes, more integrated law firm
organizational models did not hold sway until the first two decades of the
twentieth century with the inception of the law firm Cravath, Swaine & Moore
("Cravath"). 2 4 The Cravath model of systematic law firm integration gained
widespread favor on Wall Street, especially the adoption of the "up or out"
policy for the hiring and promotion of associates. Regan cites that policy as the
root of the modem "promotion to partner tournament" prevalent in Wall Street
law firms.25
Surveying Wall Street during the first two-thirds of the twentieth century,
Regan finds large law firms insulated from competitive market forces and
operated in cartel-like fashion to control costs and salaries. 2 6 Culturally inte-
grated by the common religious backgrounds and customs of their socioeconomi-
cally elite members, the firms enjoyed loose internal management and substantial
2 1. Id.
22. See id. at 16-23; see also WAYNE K. HOBSON, TE AmIcAN LEGAL PROFESSION AND THE
ORGANIZATIONAL SocIETY, 1890-1930 (1986); BERYL HAROLD LEVY, CORPORATION LAWYER: SAINT OR
SINNER? (1961); ERWIN 0. SMIGEL, THE WALL STREET LAWYER: PROFESSIONAL ORGANIZATION MAN?
(1964).
23. See REGAN, supra note 1, at 17. For the relevant background history, see Robert W. Gordon,
Legal Thought and Legal Practice in the Age of American Enterprise: 1870-1920, in PROFESSIONS AND
PROFESSIONAL IDEOLOGIES IN AMERICA 70 (Gerald L. Geison ed., 1983) and Robert W. Gordon, "The
Ideal and the Actual in the Law": Fantasies and Practices of New York City Lawyers, 1870-1910, in
THE NEW HIGH PRIESTS: LAWYERS IN POST-CIVIL WAR AMERICA 51 (Gerald W. Gawalt ed., 1984).
24. See REGAN, supra note 1, at 20; see generally ROBERT T. SWAINE, THE CRAVATH FIRM AND ITS
PREDECESSORS, 1819-1948 (1946) (providing the history and development of the firm).
25. REGAN, supra note 1, at 21 (questioning "whether the tournament is conducted on a level playing
field, how many associates actually aspire to be a partner, and the extent to which the tournament is
responsible for the rapid growth of large law firms"). See generally MARc GALANTER & THOMAS PALAY,
TouRNAMENT OF LAWYERS: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE BIG LAW FIRM (1991). But see generally George
Rutherglen & Kevin A. Kordana, A Farewell to Tournaments? The Need for an Alternative Explanation
of Law Firm Structure and Growth, 84 VA. L. REv. 1695 (1998) (rejecting a tournament theory as an
explanation for firm growth).
26. REGAN, supra note 1, at 24.
1914 [Vol. 96:1909
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external autonomy from corporate clients.2 7 In this purported "golden age,"
Milbank stood out as the "epitome" of a traditional Wall Street law firm with
strong ties to the corporate and social elite, particularly the Rockefeller family. 2 8
The golden age of the Wall Street law firm proved short-lived. In the late
1960s and early 1970s, Regan points out, large law firms confronted new
market pressures generated by global corporate competition. Globalization
pushed domestic and international corporations to increase productivity by
reducing labor costs, enhancing technology, improving economies of scale by
way of mergers and acquisitions, and expanding access to international capital
markets via investment banks and venture funds. 29 Buffeted by the escalating
use of strategic business litigation and the enactment of constraining legal
regulation, efficiency-seeking companies encouraged law firm competition
("beauty contests") and cost-effective service, while spurring the growth of
in-house legal departments. Out of this competition flowed an active lateral
market for lawyers where firm information (for example, billing rates, compen-
sation, and revenues) traded openly and "rainmakers" dominated.o
Heightened competition in the legal services marketplace, Regan explains,
compelled large firms to rationalize their internal operations "along business
lines," establishing hierarchical infrastructures, recruiting professional manag-
ers, reorganizing practice departments, and implementing financial management
systems.31 Aimed at bolstering partner profits, this business logic prodded law
firms to merge with or acquire other lawyers, accentuate "high end"32 premium
services, increase profit leverage (that is, the ratio of nonpartner lawyers to
partners), and abandon seniority-based lockstep compensation systems in favor
of entrepreneurial revenue incentives. The result tightened organizational con-
trols but weakened informal social norms in law firms, wreaking market and
cultural instability.33
For Regan, the volatility of the legal services market and the disintegration of
traditional law firm culture enlarged the influence of partnership tournaments,
practice specialties, and project teams on the character of lawyer behavior in
large law firms. Tournaments now feature an ongoing post-promotion partner-
ship competition for compensation and status where survival hinges on attaining
the rank of a "rainmaker" or, for "service" partners like John Gellene, forging
mutually enriching alliances with a "rainmaker." 34 At the same time, practice
specialties like corporate and bankruptcy law continually construct distinctive
behavioral norms generalizable across firms. Additionally, project teams, though
27. Id. at 26-27.
28. Id. at 30.
29. Id. at 31-34.
30. Id. at 34.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 35 (quoting Susan Hansen, The Young and the Restless, AM. LAW., Sept. 1995, at 69).
33. Id. at 37.
34. See id. at 37-38.
2006]1 1915
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assembled for the limited duration of a transaction such as the Bucyrus bank-
ruptcy reorganization, peristently induce cognitive perceptions of a shared
moral universe.
B. THE TOURNAMENT OF LAWYERS
The tournament of lawyers sweeping Wall Street in the late twentieth century
emerged at Milbank by the mid- 1980s. In 1984 young partners pressed the firm
to adopt a new "growth and diversification" plan emphasizing revenue and
business generation.3 6 Instituted in 1986, the plan modified partner compensa-
tion, expelling and reducing the earnings of unproductive partners ("dead-
wood"), and authorized partner lateral recruitment from rival firms specializing
in lucrative corporate practice areas. Approved by the partnership in 1990, this
strategic plan endorsed the augmentation of firm expertise in corporate transac-
tions, especially bankruptcy and mergers and acquisitions. The plan culminated
in the 1991 lateral hiring of Larry Lederman from the firm Wachtell, Lipton,
Rosen, & Katz ("Wachtell Lipton").3 7 Lederman, a hard-hitting entrepreneurial
partner at Wachtell Lipton foreign to Milbank's Anglo-Saxon Protestant culture,
maintained an extensive book of corporate and investment banking business.
By 1993, Lederman stood out as Milbank's "highest-paid and most powerful
partner," described by colleagues as an "800 pound gorilla."3 9
Gellene joined Milbank as an associate in 1980 and rose to partner in 1988,
witnessing first-hand the transformation of Milbank from an old-line, "white
shoe" law firm into an aggressive, market-driven business enterprise. That
transformation imported an entrepreneurial culture of partner competition over
the spoils of productivity and profitability. Regan reports that Gellene was
keenly aware of this tournament culture and his vulnerable status as a "service"
partner. 40 He portrays Gellene as beset by anxiety over his survival at Milbank,
in fear of lower compensation and expulsion from the firm, and oppressed by
35. Id. at 40 (noting that lawyers regard specialty norms as legitimate because they mirror the
"realities of practice in a particular field" manufactured by "'repeat players' who deal with one another
on an ongoing basis").
36. Id. at 45.
37. Id. at 45-49.
38. See id. at 16 (describing Lederman's cultural background and personality at the firm). Histori-
cally, old-line Wall Street law firms openly discriminated in hiring on the basis of ethnicity, gender,
race, and religion. Noting the "hegemony of Anglo-Saxon Protestant culture" in law firms during the
early twentieth century, Jerold Auerbach explains that "[plrofessionalism and xenophobia were mutu-
ally reinforc[ed]" and reiterated in rhetorical "themes of anti-urbanism, anti-Semitism, and nativism."
See JEROLD S. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN MODERN AMERICA 99-100
(1976).
39. REGAN, supra note 1, at 15-16.
40. Regan describes Gellene, an honors graduate from Georgetown University and Harvard Law
School, as intellectually gifted and intensely driven and hence highly accustomed to competing in, and
winning, tournaments of achievement. In fact, Regan asserts, intellectual competition and accomplish-
ment validated Gellene's sense of self-worth. Id. at 51-52.
1916 [Vol. 96:1909
THE FALL OF LEGAL ETcs
personal workaholic tendencies. 41 In 1993, Lederman asked Gellene to join the
transactional team handling the Bucyrus financial restructuring, thereby introduc-
ing him to the company's general counsel, David Goelzer. Lederman, Toni
Lichstein (a bankruptcy-related litigation partner), and two young associates
formed the core of the Bucyrus legal team at Milbank. Regan notes that Gellene
well-appreciated that "rainmaker" partners like Lederman controlled access to
large, revenue-generating corporate debtor clients, valuable assets for "service"
partners in the Milbank tournament.42
The economic history of the Bucyrus-Erie Company dates back more than a
century to its origins in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, as the mining and construction
equipment manufacturer Becor Western Corporation ("Becor Western"). In
1988, a Becor Western management group, bolstered by the investment bank
Goldman Sachs and its Broad Street Investment Fund, completed a leveraged
buyout ("LBO") of Becor Western.4 3 The LBO formed a holding company, B-E
Holdings, Inc., and an operating company, Bucyrus-Erie Company. Milbank
advised the Becor board in the transaction, while Wachtell Lipton, then led by
Lederman, counseled the buyout group." Mikael Salovaara, a rising young
partner at Goldman Sachs and a manager of Goldman's Broad Street Investment
Fund, aided the transaction. In 1989, at Salovaara's recommendation, Bucyrus
issued $75 million in notes in an exchange transaction with existing bondhold-
ers.4 6 In 1990, Jackson National Life Insurance Company ("JNL"), a Michigan
corporation owned by Prudential Insurance Company of Great Britain, pur-
chased $60 million worth of the notes.4 7 By that point, B-E Holdings and
Bucyrus-Erie Company owed $177 million to unsecured creditors.4 8 Through-
out this period, Lederman and Salovaara continued to advise Burcyrus on
financial and legal matters.49
In 1991, Salovaara left Goldman with his fellow partner, Alfred Eckert, to
form Greycliff Partners in order to manage a "vulture" investment fund called
South Street Fund. In 1992, staggered by a cash flow shortfall, an undercapital-
ization crisis, and a damaging 10K "going concern" filing by outside auditor
Deloitte & Touche, Bucyrus entered a secured debt refinancing and equipment
41. Regan highlights Gellene's intensive work habits (such as billable hours approaching and
sometimes exceeding 3000 annually) and his delinquency in submitting timely billing records
("daynotes"). He reports that the Milbank compensation committee twice penalized Gellene for such
delinquency. Id. 51-53. See also Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Sharing Among the Human
Capitalists: An Economic Inquiry into the Corporate Law Firm and How Partners Split Profits, 37
STA. L. REv. 313, 372-73 (1985) ("The effect of penalizing attorneys for not billing enough is to pit
lawyers against one another in a contest to avoid having low hours compared to their peers.").
42. REGAN, supra note 1, at 63.
43. Id. at 74.
44. Id. at 74-75.
45. Id. at 76-77.
46. id. at 80.
47. Id. at 82.
48. Id. at 83.
49. Id. at 71-87.
2006]1 1917
THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL
sale-leaseback agreement with Salovaara's South Street Fund. In 1993, bur-
dened by high interest rate payments on its outstanding debt and faced with a
declining manufacturing environment, Bucyrus retained Milbank-represented
by Gellene-and Jeff Werbalosky of Houlihan, Lokey, Howard & Zukin-a
Minneapolis financial consulting firm-to consider corporate reorganization
under Chapter 11 of the federal Bankruptcy Code.o
Beginning in February 1993, Gellene and Werbalosky advised the Bucyrus
board of directors on the financial restructuring of the company. To take
advantage of the tax consequences of Bucyrus's net operating losses in the 1993
fiscal year and to preserve its long-term viability in manufacturing,51 Gellene
and Werbalosky recommended swift board action to restructure the company by
forming a creditors committee and negotiating an exchange of debt for equity
(stock) in a new company combining B-E Holdings (the holding company) and
Bucyrus (the operating company). The board's restructuring contemplated the
simultaneous filing of a "prepackaged" bankruptcy reorganization plan and a
Chapter 11 petition with the assent of the unsecured creditors committee, the
U.S. Trustee charged with oversight, and the company's only secured creditor,
South Street Fund. The plan would convert Bucyrus into a debtor-in-possession
("DIP") with corresponding disclosure and fiduciary duties. However, JNL, the
company's largest unsecured creditor with $60 million in bonds, quickly de-
nounced the prepackaged plan and initially refused to join the creditors commit-
tee. In addition, JNL condemned all three of the pre-bankruptcy transactions-
the Salovaara-orchestrated LBO, debt-equity exchange offer, and South Street
sale-leaseback-as fraudulent conveyances unfairly benefiting the buyout group
instead of the operating company. More boldly, JNL insisted that the Bucyrus
board file a lawsuit against the parties to the pre-bankruptcy transactions and
threatened to do so independently in lieu of such action. When the board
declined to file suit in reliance upon Gellene's advice,5 2 JNL filed a fraud
complaint in federal district court in New York against Goldman, Broad Street,
and South Street. Subsequently, JNL proposed an alternative reorganization
plan.
53
In early 1994, prompted by the SEC approval of its new stock registration
statement for the restructured company, Bucyrus began soliciting pre-petition
creditor committee support for the prepackaged plan. Filed on February 18 in
federal bankruptcy court in Milwaukee, the Chapter 11 petition accompanying
50. Id. at 87-94. See 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 1101-1174 (West 2005).
51. Regan describes Bucyrus as an "old economy" manufacturing company with hard assets
(production facilities) of sufficient value to warrant reorganization rather than auction in a liquidation
sale. Reorganization pulled the bankruptcy into rancorous debtor-creditor negotiations over the relative
priority of different claimants in the reorganized company. REGAN, supra note 1, at 355-56.
52. On lawyer liability in structured finance deals, see Bruce A. Markell, The Folly ofRepresenting
Insolvent Corporations: Examining Lawyer Liability and Ethical Issues Involved in Extending Fidu-
ciary Duties to Creditors, 6 J. BANKR. L. & PRAcr. 403, 413-24 (1997); Steven L. Schwarcz, The Limits
ofLawyering: Legal Opinions in Structured Finance, 84 Tx. L. REV. 1, 31-33 (2005).
53. REGAN, supra note 1, at 97-135.
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the plan included a requisite financial disclosure statement and an application
for the appointment of Milbank as counsel to Bucyrus. At the preliminary
hearing before U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Russell Eisenberg (and throughout subse-
quent negotiations with the creditors committee), JNL objected not only to
Milbank's application, complaining of a potential conflict of interest in the dual
representation of B-E Holdings and Bucyrus, but also to the inadequacy of
Milbank's disclosure statement.54
To pass muster as counsel for the DIP under the Bankruptcy Code, an
applicant law firm must "not hold or represent an interest adverse to the
estate."5 5 Moreover, the applicant must be "disinterested."" To satisfy this
statutory criteria, Rule 2014 of the Bankruptcy Code requires the applicant to
file a declaration disclosing all "connections with the debtor, creditors, or any
other party in interest."5 7 Gellene's declaration disclosed Milbank's former
representation of JNL and current, unrelated representation of Goldman Sachs.
Citing no other connections with any other party in interest, the declaration
proclaimed Milbank as a disinterested person. Curiously, the declaration failed
to disclose Milbank's concurrent representation of Salovaara in a contractual
dispute with his Greycliff partner Alfred Eckert and in a debt purchase transac-
tion relating to Busse Broadcasting Corporation, each arising in December 1993
and continuing into 1994."
Both JNL and the U.S. Trustee filed objections to Milbank's retention applica-
tion, challenging Milbank's status as a disinterested person and contending that
the entity interests of B-E Holdings stood directly or potentially adverse to the
estate interests of Bucyrus. In March, following hearings on the retention
application, Gellene filed a supplemental declaration amplifying his prior disclo-
sures and announcing that B-E Holdings would retain local Milwaukee counsel,
thus curing the alleged concurrent conflict. Once again, the declaration made no
mention of Milbank's ongoing representation of Salovaara in matters related to
the Greycliff Partners litigation or the Busse Broadcasting Corporation transac-
tion." Without further objection from JNL counsel and the U.S. Trustee, Judge
Eisenberg approved the application and set the disclosure statement dispute for
trial.61
The trial of the disclosure statement convened in June 1994. The adequacy of
a disclosure statement turns on the release of all information material to the
reorganization plan. After hearing opening and closing arguments and witness
54. Id. at 134-72.
55. See 11 U.S.C. § 327(a) (2000).
56. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 101(14) (West 2005).
57. See FED. R. BAKR. P. 2014.
58. REGAN, supra note 1, at 149-50.
59. Id. at 147.
60. Id. at 150-56. Milbank discontinued its representation of Salovaara in the Greycliff Partners
litigation in April 1994, and in the Busse Broadcasting Corporation transaction in October 1994,
resuming the latter representation in 1995 and continuing until 1997. Id. at 156-57.
61. See id at 134-72.
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examinations, Judge Eisenberg rejected Milbank's disclosure statement as inad-
equate, finding deficiencies in the estate's investigation of pre-petition transac-
tions concerning Goldman Sachs-namely the LBO, note exchange, and sale-
leaseback. Post-trial negotiations to amend the plan ensued during the summer
months, culminating in November confirmation hearings and court-approved
implementation of the revised plan in December. In spring 1995, Milbank
applied for court-authorized professional compensation of $1.96 million in fees
and more than $370,000 in expenses. Once again, JNL objected. In May 1996,
following a November fee trial, Judge Eisenberg discarded that objection,
upholding Milbank's entitlement to approximately $1.86 million in previously
awarded fees and expenses.
In December 1996, upon learning of Milbank's representation of Salovaara in
the Greycliff Partners contractual dispute from subsequently obtained trial
transcripts, JNL and Bucyrus filed motions for sanctions, disgorgement of
Milbank's $1.86 million fee award, and revocation of the order approving
Milbank as Chapter 11 counsel for the bankruptcy estate. Bucyrus also filed a
lawsuit against Milbank in Wisconsin state court seeking $100 million in
damages for fraud, breach of contract, malpractice, and breach of fiduciary
duty.6 3 After initially concealing the JNL sanction motion from Milbank's
Bucyrus legal team, Gellene submitted an affidavit to the bankruptcy court
accepting "full and complete responsibility" for the failure to disclose Mil-
bank's concurrent representation of Salovaara and South Street, and claiming
that his error constituted "a mistake in judgment" rather than an intentional
violation of Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 2014.64
Despite his sympathetic grasp of the situation, Regan dismisses Gellene's
explanation of his repeated misconduct as unconvincing, noting Gellene's stand-
ing as an experienced bankruptcy lawyer and his recurring opportunity to rectify
the nondisclosure error. Moreover, Regan excoriates Gellene for attempting to
distinguish Salovaara's creditor status from other estate creditors, institutional
or otherwise. In 1997, Judge Eisenberg found Milbank in violation of Bank-
ruptcy Rule 2014.65
In 1997, the U.S. Attorney's Office in Milwaukee launched a criminal
investigation into Gellene's conduct in breaching Rule 2014. Plea negotiations
with prosecutors from the U.S. Attorney's Office over whether to permit
Gellene to plead guilty to a misdemeanor for contempt collapsed when U.S.
Attorney Thomas Schneider demanded a felony prosecution. In December, a
federal grand jury in Milwaukee indicted Gellene on three counts of violating
62. See id. at 173-202.
63. See id. at 209-13.
64. Id. at 214 (quoting Gellene). Milbank settled both the disgorgement lawsuit, returning the $1.86
million fee, and the malpractice suit, paying an undisclosed amount estimated at $27 to $50 million. Id.
at 231-32. In addition, the Milbank executive committee removed Gellene as a partner. Id. at 229.
65. See id. at 216.
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§§ 152 and 1623 of the federal criminal law. 66 Section 152 prohibits false oaths
or declarations in a bankruptcy proceeding. Section 1623 forbids the use of a
materially false document in a federal legal proceeding.
The federal criminal indictment stunned the bankruptcy and corporate law
firm community. The first count of the indictment charged that Gellene had
made a false declaration in his February 1994 affidavit by failing to disclose
Milbank's concurrent representation of Salovaara, Greycliff Partners, and South
Street. The second count applied the same charge of nondisclosure to Gellene's
March 1994 amended declaration. The third count charged that Gellene made
use of a false document-the March 1994 amended declaration-in support of
his fee-related trial testimony in November 1995.6
Unsurprisingly, Gellene pleaded not guilty to all three counts of the indict-
ment.70 In March 1998, the federal jury reached a guilty verdict on all counts.
Acting under the federal sentencing guidelines, U.S. District Judge J.P. Stadtmuel-
ler imposed a fifteen-month concurrent sentence, with eligibility for two-months
credit for good behavior; a fine of $15,000; and two years of supervised
release.72 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit upheld the sentence
on appeal.
C. THE MORAL UNIVERSE OF CORPORATE BANKRUPTCY PRACTICE
Having meticulously charted Gellene's professional rise and fall, Regan turns
from the history and sociology of the large law firm to the culture of corporate
transactional lawyers, specifically the interpretive culture of ethics and ethics
rule construction. To Regan, the transactional culture of corporate and bank-
ruptcy lawyers molds the construction of ethics rules, creating shared meaning
and mutual understanding. The breadth and complexity of large law firm
corporate transactions ensnare conflicts of interest principles in that meaning-
making process.
Regan concedes that ascertaining conflicts in a transactional setting requires
intricate judgments and harbors profound consequences. For Gellene, the conse-
quences of a full conflicts disclosure in the Bucyrus bankruptcy risked likely
disqualification, a result anathema to his budding relationship with Lederman
and antithetical to his vulnerable position in the Milbank partnership tourna-
66. Id. at 225-30.
67. See 18 U.S.C. § 152 (2000).
68. See 18 U.S.C. § 1623 (2000).
69. See REGAN, supra note 1, at 230-31.
70. See id. at 231.
71. See id. at 272.
72. See id. at 284-87. On the punishment of corporate crime under the Federal Sentencing Guide-
lines, see Diane E. Murphy, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines for Organizations: A Decade of
Promoting Compliance and Ethics, 87 IOWA L. REv. 697 (2002); Dan K. Webb & Steven F. Molo, Some
Practical Considerations in Developing Effective Compliance Programs: A Framework for Meeting the
Requirements of the Sentencing Guidelines, 71 WASH. U. L. REv. 375 (1993).
73. See United States v. Gellene, 182 F.3d 578 (7th Cir. 1999).
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ment.7 4 For large law firm corporate transactional lawyers, especially bank-
ruptcy specialists like Gellene, conflicts of interest are an ever-present facet of
practice in multiple client and corporate family contexts.
Regan explains that transactional lawyers, unlike litigators, demonstrate a
high tolerance for potential conflicts of interest in the familiar corporate circum-
stances of concurrent representation. Part of that tolerance stems from the
dense, interwoven nature of entity representation and transactional practice in
corporate law. By design, corporate law interweaves disparate individuals and
varied interests in joint undertakings dictated by form and need. Corporate
entities involve manifold constituents (directors, officers, and shareholders) and
common interests (financial and organizational). Corporate transactions entail
multiple parties (buyer-seller, lender-borrower, and operating partner-holding
company investor) and convergent interests (financial and situational). Both
efficiency and commonality imply the logic of concurrent or simultaneous
representation even in the face of conflicts.
Part of the transactional lawyer tolerance for conflicts also derives from the
litigation-oriented content of the ethics rules regulating conflicts of interest.
The current rules and standards governing conflicts of interest in federal and
state courts derive from nearly a century of regulatory history under the
American Bar Association's ("ABA") Canons,78 Model Code,79 and Model
Rules,80 and the American Law Institute's Restatement of the Law Governing
Lawyers.8 ' Embodied in ABA Model Rule 1.7, conflict of interest principles
govern a lawyer's representation of adverse interests. Paragraph (a) of Rule 1.7
prohibits a lawyer from "represent[ing] a client if the representation involves a
concurrent conflict of interest." 8 2 That paragraph denotes a concurrent conflict
of interest under one of two circumstances: either when "the representation of
74. REGAN, supra note 1, at 173-74.
75. See id. at 314-319. See generally SUSAN P. SHAPIRO, TANGLED LOYALTIES: CONFLICT OF INTEREST IN
LEGAL PRACTICE 96-109 (2002) (describing conflicts of interest in corporate organizational settings);
Kevin McMunigal, Rethinking Attorney Conflict of Interest Doctrine, 5 GEo. J. LEGAL ETmIcs 823
(1992) (exploring risk avoidance in concurrent conflicts of interest); Marc I. Steinberg & Timothy U.
Sharpe, Attorney Conflicts of Interest: The Need for a Coherent Framework, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1
(1990); W. Bradley Wendel, Conflicts of Interest Under the Revised Model Rules, 81 NEB. L. REv. 1363
(2003) (comparing rules for multiple client conflicts under Nebraska law with the 2002 Model Rules);
W. Bradley Wendel, The Deep Structure of Conflicts of Interest, 16 GEO. J. LEGAL ETMcs 473 (2003)
(assessing the roles of discretion and judgment in conflicts of interest in reviewing ANDREw STARK,
CoNFIcr OF INTEREST IN AMERIcAN PUBLIC LIFE (2000) and CONFuIcT OF INTEREST IN THE PROFESSIONS
(Michael Davis & Andrew Stark eds., 2001)).
76. REGAN, supra note 1, at 314-21.
77. Id.
78. CANONS OF PROF'L ETmIcs Canon 6 (1908) (governing both adverse and conflicting interests).
79. MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILrrY DR 5-101(A) (1983) (governing personal conflicts); id. at
DR 5-105(A)-(C) (governing conflicts with other clients).
80. MODEL RuLEs OF PROF'L CoNDuCr R. 1.7 (2004).
81. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIm) OF THE LAW GoVERNING LAWYERS §§ 121-122, 125, 128,
130-131, & 135 (2000).
82. MODEL RuLEs OF PROF'L CoNDucr R. 1.7(a) (2004).
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one client will be directly adverse to another client;" or, alternatively, when
"there is a significant risk that the representation of one .. . client[] will be
materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client, a former
client, or a third person[,] or by a personal interest of the lawyer."8 3
Paragraph (b) of Rule 1.7 mitigates the prohibitions arising out of directly
adverse and materially limited representations. Under paragraph (b), a lawyer
may represent a client, notwithstanding the existence of a concurrent conflict of
interest, when four conditions converge:
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes that the lawyer will be able to provide
competent and diligent representation to each affected client; (2) the represen-
tation is not prohibited by law; (3) the representation does not involve the
assertion of a claim by one client against another client represented by the
lawyer in the same litigation or other proceeding before a tribunal; and (4)
each affected client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing. 84
The Comment to Rule 1.7 enumerates general principles guiding the applica-
tion of concurrent conflicts of interest analysis. Predicated on the "essential
elements" of "loyalty and independent judgment,"85 the principles steer the
"[r]esolution of conflict of interest problem[s]" through a four-step, lawyer-
directed analysis.8 6 The first step requires the clear identification of the client.
The second step demands a "[determination] whether a conflict of interest
exists."8 The third step asks "whether the representation may be undertaken
despite the existence of a conflict." 8 9 If the conflict proves "consentable," 90 then
the lawyer proceeds to the fourth step. That final step requires client consulta-
tion and "informed consent, confirmed in writing." 91
In identifying conflicts, the Rule 1.7 Comment further notes that both directly
adverse and material limitation conflicts can arise in nonlitigation, transactional
matters. Even without direct adversity, a nonlitigation conflict "exists if there is
83. Id.
84. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CoNDucr R. 1.7(b) (2004).
85. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CoNDucr R. 1.7 cmt. 1 (2004).




90. The Comment links the consentability of a conflict to the circumstances of representation,
permitting simultaneous representation "where the clients are generally aligned in interest even though
there is some difference in interest among them" and where lawyers are able to "resolve potentially
adverse interests by developing the parties' mutual interests." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDucr R. 1.7
cmt. 28 (2004). In specific, "a lawyer may seek to establish or adjust a relationship between clients on
an amicable and mutually advantageous basis; for example, in helping to organize a business in which
two or more clients are entrepreneurs, working out the financial reorganization of an enterprise in which
two or more clients have an interest or arranging a property distribution in settlement of an estate." Id.
(commenting also that "a lawyer may not represent multiple parties to a negotiation whose interests are
fundamentally antagonistic to each other").
91. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CoNDucr R. 1.7 cmt. 12 (2004).
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a significant risk that a lawyer's ability to consider, recommend or carry out an
appropriate course of action for the client will be materially limited as a result
of the lawyer's other responsibilities or interests."9 2 That material risk "in effect
forecloses alternatives that would otherwise be available to the client."9 3 Fac-
tors relevant to the determination of a "significant potential for material limita-
tion include the duration and intimacy of the lawyer's relationship with the
client or clients involved, the functions being performed by the lawyer, the
likelihood that disagreements will arise and the likely prejudice to the client
from the conflict."9 4
Reiterating this approach, the American Law Institute's Restatement of the
Law Governing Lawyers puts forward a conflict of interest standard that
similarly evaluates the nature, significance, and probability of an adverse or
prohibited effect "in terms of factual predicates and practical consequences that
are reasonably susceptible of objective assessment."95 The question of prohib-
ited effect turns on risk. The Restatement standard requires a substantial risk of
adverse effect on the quality of lawyer representation. The notion of adverse
effect refers to the quality of the representation rather than the quality of the
result. The likelihood of a materially adverse effect is substantial when the
circumstances of risk are significant and plausible, even if the effect is uncertain
or improbable instead of immediate, actual, and apparent.9 6 The Restatement
"employs an objective standard by which to assess the adverseness, materiality,
and substantiality of the risk of the effect on representation."9 7 This standard
looks to the "facts and circumstances that the lawyer knew or should have
known at the time of undertaking or continuing a representation," not to the
appearance of impropriety.98
Like the Model Rules, the Restatement addresses concurrent client representa-
tion in both litigated and nonlitigated matters. Determining whether an adverse
conflict of material client interest exists requires careful parsing of the circum-
stances of the representation. The Restatement recommends a three-pronged
inquiry in complex, multiparty situations examining the predomination of issues
common to the clients' interests, the impracticability of separate representation
given the circumstances and size of each client's interests, and the extent of
92. MODEL RuLEs OF PROF'L CoNDucr R. 1.7 cmt. 8 (2004) ("For example, a lawyer asked to
represent several individuals seeking to form a joint venture is likely to be materially limited in the
lawyer's ability to recommend or advocate all possible positions that each might take because of the
lawyer's duty of loyalty to the others.").
93. Id. ("The critical questions are the likelihood that a difference in interests will eventuate and, if it
does, whether it will materially interfere with the lawyer's independent professional judgment in
considering alternatives or foreclose courses of action that reasonably should be pursued on behalf of
the client.").
94. MODEL RuLEs OF PROF'L CoNDucr R. 1.7 cmt. 26 (2004) ("The question is often one of proximity
and degree.").
95. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GovERNiNo LAWYERS § 121 cmt. c (2000).
96. Id. § 121 cmt. c(iii).
97. Id. § 121 cmt. c(iv).
98. Id.; see also id. § 121 cmt. c(iii).
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active judicial supervision of the representation."
For both the Model Rules and the Restatement, the main thrust of conflict
analysis is risk and harm. Conflict situations require an assessment of the level
of risk impinging on the client-lawyer relationship and the degree of harm
weighing upon the representation. In situations of complex transactional negotia-
tion and litigation, as in the Bucyrus bankruptcy, conflict analysis goes beyond
superficial inquiry into the appearance of impropriety to a more searching
examination of the risk of substantive harm to client interests, to the client-
lawyer relationship, and to the vigor of lawyer representation."'"
In searching the culture of corporate transactional lawyers, Regan discovers
marked normative tolerance for potential conflicts.1 o0 He attributes this toler-
ance to corporate client preference for transactional lawyers equipped to act as
"reputational intermediaries" with banks, underwriters, and joint venture part-
ners. 10 2 This efficiency-based preference springs from temporal and transaction
cost savings. Regan finds a similar client preference for informality in negotia-
tion and even in lawyer retention-for example, in the client assent to lawyer-
requested conflict waivers. o The widespread intermediary function of corporate
lawyers, coupled with negotiated informality, creates ambiguity in transactional
contexts. 104 Regan remarks that such ambiguity affords corporate lawyers
opportunities for self-serving rationalization and even self-deception when navi-
gating multiple client relationships in corporate transactions, such as bankruptcy
reorganization. 05
To illustrate this contextual process, Regan explicates the recent history of
bankruptcy practice, tracking the economic movements and Bankruptcy Code
revisions that reinvigorated the field, despite its inherently episodic and cyclical
nature, complicated statutory and regulatory scheme, and specialized tribu-
nals.'0 He nimbly describes the profit-motivated acquisition of small bank-
ruptcy firms by large law firms like Milbank and the recurrent conflicts of
interest spawned by their major institutional debtor clients in corporate bankrupt-
cies where multiple parties, often former and current clients, clash over pay-
outs.107 Although he credits law firm objections to conflicts-related
disqualification on policy and efficiency grounds and concedes the frequent
99. Id. § 128 cmt. d(iii).
100. Id. § 128 cmt. b (discussing the prohibition against conflicts of interest and its effect on
effective legal representation).
101. REGAN, supra note 1, at 314.
102. Id. at 316.
103. Id. at 317-18.
104. Id. at 314-19.
105. Id. at 319.
106. Id. at 58, 326. For a general discussion of the changes in U.S. bankruptcy law, see DAvtD SKEEL,
DEBT'S DOMINION: A HISTORY OF BANKRuprcY LAW IN AMERICA (2001); Teresa A. Sullivan et al., The
Persistence of Local Legal Culture: Twenty Years of Experience from the Federal Bankruptcy Courts,
17 HARv. J. L. & PuB. POL'Y 801 (1994).
107. REGAN, supra note 1, at 326-27.
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statutory incoherence of the Bankruptcy Code as well as the inconsistent
jurisprudence of bankruptcy courts, Regan underscores that Gellene plainly
understood his mandatory disclosure duties under Rule 2014 and the imminent
risks of disqualification in Wisconsin bankruptcy court, in contrast to more
tolerant New York or Delaware federal courts.108 Distorted by tournament
motive, that understanding garnered justification from an alternative moral
universe of practice. Animated by the ascendant norms of large firm bankruptcy
practice, this moral universe shielded Gellene's conceptions of loyalty and
independence because it posited joint interests among Salovaara, South Street,
and Bucyrus in safeguarding the resources and manufacturing position of the
company estate from the hostile claims of JNL.1 09
Regan's adroit tracking of Gellene's professional fall from the sheltered
preserve of elite law firm society demonstrates the importance of contextual
understanding in legal ethics regulation. Without an appreciation for the history
and sociology of the large law firm, its competitive tournament incentives, its
practice specialty norms, and project team pressures, the gravity of the moral
universe pulling corporate bankruptcy lawyers into risk-taking behavior would
go unnoticed. The next Part considers whether this distinctive moral universe
conforms to the classical norms of the profession.
II. CLASSICAL NoRMs
"'[T]hey were the kind of people you would just trust completely."'
110
The classical norms of the profession historically informed both the culture
and the sociology of large law firm corporate practice. They delineated charac-
ter and regulated conduct. They commanded loyalty and consensus. And they
defined public and private obligation.
Classical norms imbued law firm culture and sociology with the ideals of
fraternity and community. They defined lawyer character and conduct in terms
of wisdom, prudence, and craft-like virtuosity. They cultivated the values of
firm loyalty and institutional consensus. And they celebrated lawyer public
leadership and law firm civic-mindedness.
Regan's account of the Bucyrus bankruptcy shows the fragile entailments of
classical norms lingering in tournament contests, transactional conventions, and
moral constructions. Although no longer pervasive, the norms resurface in the
turmoil of ambition, anxiety, and rationalization plaguing Gellene and the
Milbank legal team. To Regan, Gellene's downfall and Milbank's complicity
signal more than the self-conscious wrongdoing of dereliction or corruption."1 '
Instead, their conduct reflects a changing normative environment where "highly
108. Id. at 291, 326-33.
109. See id. at 345-48.
110. Id. at 368 (quoting David Goelzer, general counsel for Bucyrus).
11l. Id. at 350.
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accomplished lawyers" and their "powerful law firms" strain the bounds of
ethical judgment in the pursuit of productivity and profit.12
The normative judgments of John Gellene offend the classical norms of
public professionalism." 3 In law and ethics, Anthony Kronman, Robert Cover,
and Tom Shaffer each offer classical visions of public professionalism. Kron-
man's vision of classical norms tilts toward secular convention in urging the
public virtue and wisdom of the lawyer-statesman.1 4 To Kronman, the lawyer-
statesman accepts accountability and responsibility while keeping within the
traditions of the legal order. Cover's vision, by contrast, reaches out for
normative diversity and dialogue beyond secular traditions among outsider
ethical communities." 5 For Cover, outsider dialogue creates new meanings and
generates new voices silenced by the dominant legal order. Akin to Cover,
Shaffer encourages moral dialogue subversive of the dominant order." 6 Yet, for
Shaffer, dialogue rises out of faith and community-affirming spirituality.
Classical norms infuse the contemporary professionalism movement in spite
of interpretive contest over their meaning and regulatory force." 7 This classical
content is acutely pronounced in Kronman's recent work." 8 Kronman's interpre-
tation of classical norms is bound up in the vision of the lawyer-statesman.
Inspired by a sense of civic trusteeship, this traditional vision compels lawyers
to embrace the custodial work of conserving past professional ideals. The
caliber and character of that work reveal the quality of lawyer judgment. To
Kronman, the caliber of a lawyer's mind and the virtue of his character derive
from technical virtuosity as well as practical wisdom and prudence, which find
their embodiment in good judgment.11 9
112. Id. at 350-51.
113. For exposition of the classical norms manifested in the ABA Canons, see Susan D. Carle,
Lawyers'Duty to Do Justice: A New Look at the History of the 1908 Canons, 24 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 1
(1999) (focusing on the "justice" of a client's case but touching on the purposes of an ethical code).
114. See ANTHONY KRONmAN, THE LOST LAWYER 11-52 (4th prtg. 1995).
115. See infra notes 156-60 and accompanying text.
116. See infra notes 161-65 and accompanying text.
117. See Rob Atkinson, A Dissenter's Commentary on the Professionalism Crusade, 74 Thx. L. REv.
259 (1995) (challenging assumption of "one true professional faith" and tendency toward overbroad
condemnation of conduct); Robert W. Gordon, Professionalisms Old and New, Good and Bad, 8 LEGAL
ETHICs 23 (2005) (pointing to the limits of professionalism as an ethical guide); W. Bradley Wendel,
Morality, Motivation, and the Professionalism Movement, 52 S.C. L. REV. 557 (2001) (citing the
ambiguities of professionalism); W. Bradley Wendel, Professionalism as Interpretation, 99 Nw. U. L.
REv. 1167 (2005) (linking professionalism to the interpretation of legal norms).
118. See KRoNMAN, supra note 114; see also SOL M. LiNowrrz & MARTIN MAYER, THE BETRAYED
PROFESSION: LAWYERING AT THE END OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (1996) (condemning the lowered
standards of the legal profession). For criticism, see Marc Galanter, Lawyers in the Mist: The Golden
Age of Legal Nostalgia, 100 DICK. L. REv. 549 (1996) (examining Kronman's claim of declining virtue
within the legal profession); David B. Wilkins, Practical Wisdom for Practicing Lawyers: Separating
Ideals from Ideology in Legal Ethics, 108 HARv. L. REv. 458 (1994) (reviewing ANTHONY KRONMAN,
THE LOsT LAWYER (1993)).
119. See KRoNMAN, supra note 114, at 15. The instant account offers a more generous reading of
Kronman's jurisprudence than my earlier depiction. See Anthony V. Alfieri, Denaturalizing the Lawyer-
Statesman, 93 MIcH. L. REv. 1204, 1229-30 (1995) (reviewing ANTHONY KRoNMAN, THE LOST LAWYER:
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Good judgment forms the core of Kronman's ideal of the lawyer-states-
man.120 Winnowed from the elements of practical wisdom, prudentialism, craft,
and public service, the lawyer-statesman ideal imagines law as a craft-like
activity. 12 1 For Kronman, craft infuses professional life with personal meaning
realized in advocacy, counseling, and a commitment to the public good.12 2 That
commitment denotes civic spirit. Exemplified in excellence and wisdom, the
spirit of civic responsibility connotes a special talent for judgment and leader-
ship. 12 3 This talent coincides with the public good and, more germane here,
extends to matters of private interest.124
The pull of public and private interests tests character. Good character
depends on the qualities of intellectual skill and excellence of judgment. 1 25
Kronman defines judgment as a superior ability to discern the public good.1 2 6
That ability comes from both striving to be a connoisseur of the law and caring
for the good of the law.121 Connoisseurs of the law declare devotion to the law's
well-being.12 8 Devotion entails foresight, a character trait essential to practical
wisdom.12 9 For the lawyer-statesman, practical wisdom goes beyond love of the
public good to an engagement in deliberation.1 30 The virtue of statesmanship
resides in the public leader exceptionally skilled in the wisdom of deliberation
fostered for the good of the community.' 3 1 The special virtue of a civic leader
flows from his extraordinary devotion to his community and from his superior
capacity to discern its best interests. 13 2
Kronman's classical norms permit the lawyer to exercise practical wisdom in
making hard judgments about incommensurable public and private interests. To
Kronman, wise private or personal judgment hinges on the condition of integ-
rity.13 3 Wise public judgment, in contrast, rests on the condition of fraternity.134
Lawyers demonstrate fraternity when they overcome personal or professional
differences to participate in a deliberative debate about the best interests of their
community. 13 Participation demands the deliberative arts of compassion and
FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION (1993) and arguing that Kronman's emphasis on instrumental
values in the ethics of lawyering causes him to place "faith in an artifact that privileges the mind and
character of elite white, male, large-firm private lawyers").
120. See KRONMAN, supra note 114, at 15.
121. See id. at 14-17, 295.
122. See id. at 12.
123. See id. at 14-15.
124. See id.
125. See id. at 35.
126. See id.
127. See id. at 139.
128. See id. at 86.
129. See id. at 33-34.
130. See id. at 35.
131. See id. at 54.
132. See id.
133. See id. at 93.
134. See id.
135. See id. at 92-93.
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detachment enlivened by a spirit of affectionate good will.' 6 This spirit of civic
friendship interweaves tolerance and union to establish fraternity.13 7
The values and goals of fraternity guide the lawyer practices of judging,
counseling, and advocacy. Kronman finds commonality in these practices,
linking their exercise to deliberative wisdom and civic-mindedness. This link-
age connects the means-ends calculations of client representation to larger
considerations and other-regarding interests. These enlarged considerations and
interests place lawyers and judges inside a common practice less differentiated
by means-ends stratagems and more tempered by a concern for the good of the
law itself.138
To Kronman, the practice commonalities of judging and advocacy stem from
a shared attitude of civic-mindedness employed in assessing the good of the
legal order expressed in laws and the good of the community fostered by
laws.13 9 This dual assessment compels lawyers to neutralize the norms of client
welfare in deference to the soundness of law and legal order. The good lawyer's
public-spirited deference to law and legal order overrides competing loyalties to
both clients and courts when moral conflicts intrude. 14 0
Kronman's deference to the traditions of law and legal order arises from a
common law reverence for prudence. A mixture of intellectual capacity and
temperament, prudence unites the qualities of wisdom and character to engage
the moral pluralism of value conflict in law and lawyering. Typified by balance,
prudentialism searches for a pragmatic accommodation of conflicting interests.
This search calls upon the distinctive character traits, expert skills, and imagina-
tive powers demonstrated by good lawyers in handling cases. 141
For Kronman, prudence in handling cases resembles an art form. Honed from
well-crafted deliberation, the prudence of the good lawyer comes from fastening
an expert knowledge of the law to the imaginative ability of lawyering. This
binding of law to lawyering serves the intrinsic purposes of the law itself, rather
than the instrumental purposes of client interest or personal profit. Mastery of
the art of craft in the service of the public good fuels the ambition of the
lawyer-statesman.1 4 2
Kronman's call for a public-spirited ambition to advance the good of the law
requires lawyers to reconcile the imperatives of commerce with the moral
aspirations of professionalism. 14 3 A product of practical wisdom and character
virtue, reconciliation restores the non-instrumental role of the lawyer as a moral
136. See id. at 99-100.
137. See id.
138. See id. at 134 (observing the cooperative role between lawyers and judges).
139. See id. (discussing how lawyers' work includes that of judges'-"namely, the maintenance of
the rule of law").
140. Id. at 143-46 (defining the good lawyer's public-spirited devotion to law as an essential
component of craft).
141. See id. at 21, 238, 247-48.
142. See id. at 300-01, 316, 349-50, 359-63.
143. See id. at 316.
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agent called to the law as a profession. 1" Faithful to the secular idea of law as a
calling, Kronman regards lawyering as a kind of salvation.14 5 The work of
lawyering connects the individual to the collective in the public world of
advocacy and counseling. That connection transforms the character and identity
of the human personality. For Kronman, the personal fulfillment gleaned through
meaningful connection to the world outside of the self accrues strength from
traditional institutions and professional ideals. 14 6 Fulfillment wanes when the
meaning-giving capacity of such institutions and ideals weakens against the
weight of instrumental ends. 147
Disturbed by the instrumental transformation of large corporate law firms, the
historical standard-bearers of the lawyer-statesman ideal, into mechanisms of
single-minded profit and arid productivity, Kronman surveys the profession for
an environment more hospitable to purposive commitments to craft, wisdom,
and the public good.14 8 His decades-long catalogue of changes in the culture,
structure, and practice of the large law firm affirms the fall of the wise counselor
and the rise of the mercenary technocrat in the profession. Echoing Regan, this
catalogue compiles changes in firm size, staffing hierarchies, compensation
systems, group specialization, and lawyer-firm continuity. 149 Both Kronman and
Regan expose the harmful effects of these market-driven alterations, evinced by
the loss of firm stability and lawyer solidarity.1 50 Compounded by the unremit-
ting growth of specialized knowledge and the continuing shift to a more
ephemeral transactional client-firm relationship, these constraining effects nar-
row the opportunities for lawyers to develop the moral capacity for the ends-
oriented judgments critical to third party and public deliberation. That deliberative
capacity, at once client-centered and other-regarding, denotes the wise coun-
selor.
The cultivated judgment and civic character of the wise counselor distin-
guishes the deliberative practice of law from the technical skills of lawyering.
For the wise counselor, the law constitutes an intrinsic good, not an instrumental
enterprise of commerce. Its non-instrumental valuation as an honorable calling
with intrinsic rewards and satisfactions apart from mercantilism condemns the
culture and customs of modem large firm corporate law practice. Dominated by
managerial canons and marketplace imperatives, that culture devalues the vir-
tues of character and craftsmanship crucial to Kronman's ideal of the lawyer-
statesman. 151
144. Id. at 316-17, 359-62, 366-68.
145. See id. at 370-72.
146. See id. at 371-72.
147. See id. at 370.
148. Id. at 272-314.
149. Id. at 273-83; REGAN, supra note 1, at 31-42.
150. See KRoNMAN, supra note 114, at 278-79. Regan remarks, "All large firms .. . now inhabit a
universe whose governing laws are those of the market." REGAN, supra note 1, at 42.
151. See generally id. at 291-300.
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The traditional ideal of a public-minded profession invoked by Kronman
circulates in the republican norms of early ethics regimes. 15 2 Urging greater
accountability,' responsibility,154 and public virtue,'15 republican norms en-
large the ambit of the lawyer's ethical situation.1 56 This enlarged treatment of
legal ethics as a reservoir of group or community norms has deep roots in the
profession."s' Drafters of both state and national codes point explicitly to the
community-based normative underpinnings of ethics rules.'1 8 The rules encode
norms in the text of the initial canons, the late century disciplinary rules and
ethical considerations of the Model Code, and the current rules and comments
of the Model Rules. Regulatory enforcement reaffirms these norms when
supportive of other-regarding third party or public interests.159
152. See Russell G. Pearce, Lawyers As America's Governing Class: The Formation and Dissolution
of the Original Understanding of the American Lawyer's Role, 8 U. Cm. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 381, 384
(2001) (discussing how "common good" lay at the center of republican thought); Russell G. Pearce,
Rediscovering the Republican Origins of the Legal Ethics Codes, 6 GEo. J. LEGAL ETmIcs 241, 241
(1992); see also Norman W. Spaulding, The Myth of Civic Republicanism: Interrogating the Ideology of
Antebellum Legal Ethics, 71 FoRDHAM L. REv. 1397 (2003).
153. See Roger C. Cramton, Furthering Justice by Improving the Adversary System and Making
Lawyers More Accountable, 70 FoRDHAM L. REv. 1599, 1610-14 (2002); see also Roger C. Cramton,
Lawyer Conduct in the "Tobacco Wars", 51 DEPAUL L. REv. 435, 436-39 (2001) (noting that
adversarial tactics of tobacco lawyers have been "morally objectionable"); David Luban, The Bad Man
and the Good Lawyer: A Centennial Essay on Holmes's The Path of Law, 72 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1547,
1571, 1581 (1997) (examining Holmes's paradigmatic view of the lawyer as representative of the "bad
man"); W. Bradley Wendel, Informal Methods of Enhancing the Accountability of Lawyers, 54 S.C. L.
Rev. 967, 968 (2003).
154. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Equality and Affiliation as Bases of Ethical Responsibility, 61 LA.
L. REv. 173, 173-74 (2000); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Lawyer for the Situation, 39 VAL. U. L. REv. 377,
379 (2004); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Responsibility, Professional and Otherwise, 31 CONN. L. REv.
1139, 1139 (1999).
155. See W. Bradley Wendel, Public Values and Professional Responsibility, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REv.
1, 26-29 (1999); W. Bradley Wendel, Value Pluralism in Legal Ethics, 78 WASH. U. L.Q. 113, 116-18
(2000).
156. Brandeis stands as the best exemplar of this enlarged scope of lawyer responsibility. See
William H. Simon, Babbitt v. Brandeis: The Decline of the Professional Ideal, 37 STAN. L. REv. 565,
565-66 (1985); Clyde Spillenger, Elusive Advocate: Reconsidering Brandeis as People's Lawyer, 105
YALE L.J. 1445, 1471 (1996); see also DAvID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JusTIcE: AN ETmcAL STUDY 237-38
(1988) (applauding the "Brandeisian vision of moral activism").
157. See W. Bradley Wendel, Nonlegal Regulation of the Legal Profession: Social Norms in
Professional Communities, 54 VAND. L. REv. 1955, 1960 (2001). See generally W. Bradley Wendel,
Mixed Signals: Rational-Choice Theories of Social Norms and the Pragmatics of Explanation, 77 IND.
L.J. 1 (2002) (assailing normative weakness in rational-choice theories of social norms).
158. See Susan P. Koniak, The Law Between the Bar and the State, 70 N.C. L. REv. 1389, 1391
(1992); Susan P. Koniak, Through the Looking Glass of Ethics and the Wrongs with Rights We Find
There, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL Emcs 1, 1 (1995). See generally Roger C. Cramton & Susan P. Koniak, Rule,
Story, and Commitment in the Teaching of Legal Ethics, 38 WM. & MARY L. REv. 145 (1996)
(discerning community norms within ethics rules, narratives, and commitments).
159. See Benjamin H. Barton, An Institutional Analysis of Lawyer Regulation: Who Should Control
Lawyer Regulation-Courts, Legislatures, or the Market?, 37 GA. L. REv. 1167, 1182 (2003); Geoffrey
C. Hazard, Jr., State Supreme Court Regulatory Authority over the Legal Profession, 72 NOTRE DAME L.
REv. 1177, 1179 (1997); David B. Wilkins, How Should We Determine Who Should Regulate Lawyers?-
Managing Conflict and Context in Professional Regulation, 65 FoRDHAM L. REv. 465, 480 (1996);
David B. Wilkins, Who Should Regulate Lawyers?, 105 HARv. L. REv. 799, 834 (1992).
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Contrary to Kronman, the bond between ethics and norms is fashioned from
moral community, not simply the laws and customs of a prevailing legal order.
Robert Cover finds this linkage embodied in the concept of a nomos.160 To
Cover, a nomos represents "a present world constituted by a system of tension
between reality and vision."16 ' When conceived as a world of law, a nomos
"entails the application of human will to an extant state of affairs as well as
toward our visions of alternative futures."16 2 Ethics rules reflect the tension
between the reality and vision of professionalism. The application of human
will behind their drafting and enforcement comes by community will and state
decree. That law-sanctioned decree imposes a dominant normative order on a
social world composed of diverse ethical communities and contested ethical
narratives.163 The scattered redundancy of ethics rule formulation and enforce-
ment at federal and state levels conforms to Cover's anarchistic preference for
normative diffusion and dialogue. Cover endorses the fragmentation of power
and local control in law and politics; fragmentation articulates polycentric
norms essential to moral diversity.'6"
The vision of community-based norm articulation and moral aspiration also
arises in the work of Thomas Shaffer. For Shaffer, justice is central to the
normative universe of a community. Often expressed in a kind of prophetic
vision, 1 6 5 community justice acquires substance from religion and religious
faith.16 6 Shaffer views religious norms as a source of moral responsibility, even
when subversive of law.16 7 His sponsored ethic of responsibility rests on
spirituality realized in relation to others and in engagement with community.16 8
The wellspring of prophetic vision, spirituality in law compels the transforma-
160. See Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term-Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97
HARv. L. REv. 4, 4 (1983); cf. Anthony V. Alfieri, The Ethics of Violence: Necessity, Excess, and
Opposition, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1721, 1728 (1994) (examining the role of lawyers in Cover's writings).
161. Cover, supra note 160, at 9.
162. Id.
163. See Robert M. Cover, The Origins of Judicial Activism in the Protection of Minorities, 91 Yale
L.J. 1287, 1301-02 (1982). See generally ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTIcE AcCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE
JuDiciAL PROCESS (1975) (tracing the moral dilemmas and dissonance spawned by the enactment and
enforcement of the Fugitive Slave Law).
164. See Robert M. Cover, The Uses of Jurisdictional Redundancy: Interest, Ideology, and Innova-
tion, 22 Wm. & MARY L. REV. 639, 658-80, 682 (1981).
165. Theologically, Shaffer's prophetic vision comes from a biblical sense of justice and spiritual
renewal. See Thomas L. Shaffer, Should a Christian Lawyer Sign Up for Simon's Practice of Justice?,
51 STAN. L. REv. 903 (1999) (reviewing WILuAM H. SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE: A THEORY OF
LAWYERS' ETmcs (1998)); Thomas L. Shaffer, The Irony of Lawyers'Justice in America, 70 FoRDHAM L.
REV. 1857 (2002).
166. See generally THOMAS L. SHAFFER, ON BEING A CHRISTIAN AND A LAWYER: LAW FOR THE INNOCENT
(198 1); Thomas L. Shaffer, Legal Ethics and Jurisprudence from Within Religious Congregations, 76
NOTRE DAME L. REv. 961 (2001).
167. See Thomas L. Shaffer, Faith Tends to Subvert Legal Order, 66 FoRDHAM L. REV. 1089 (1998);
see also Thomas L. Shaffer, Client Counseling and Moral Responsibility, 30 PEPP. L. REv. 591, 628
(2003).
168. On spiritual engagement as love and reconstructive community, see Anthony E. Cook, Beyond
Critical Legal Studies: The Reconstructive Theology of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., 103 HARv. L. REV.
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tion of the profession into a responsive moral community.' Basic to spiritual
fulfillment, that transformation entails both self-alteration and context-
transcendence. Transcendence connects the self and the other in a moment of
communion. That community-affirming moment enables the investigation of
alternative types of client-lawyer relationships that neither devalue nor exclude
moral commitment to others beside the client. At the crux of that investigation
stands moral decisionmaking.
Lawyer moral decisionmaking abides in the general obligation to reconcile
competing visions of the common good in law and ethics. Discharging this
obligation requires lawyers to combat moral disassociation and to eschew
self-interest in both advocacy and counseling. The abandonment of client and
personal self-interest begins the process of reconciling client individual rights
and lawyer social responsibilities. That process entrusts lawyers as custodians
of community. Their custodial duty involves dialogue with clients and communi-
ties over the place and power of conscience in opposing self-dealing. Dialogue
brings compassion and empathy for the interests of the other into the lawyering
process.
The rediscovery and integration of classical norms into the lawyering process
draws direction and strength from the work of Kronman, Cover, and Shaffer.
Although they present distinct secular and nonsecular visions of the lawyer in
society, they share commitments to fellowship and community bound alter-
nately by prudential deliberation, moral dialogue, and spiritual faith. They also
share in the belief that private self-interest may be overcome in the pursuit of a
greater public good. The next section explores how risk management norms
may impoverish moral dialogue and thereby hamper the pursuit of the public
good.
III. RISK MANAGEMENT NORMS
'He comes into compliance just enough to get paid."' 170
Risk management norms permeate contemporary law and society. Fabricated
surrogates for unstable social norms,17 1 they reflect the moral anxiety of modem
985 (1990); Anthony E. Cook, The Death of God in American Pragmatism and Realism: Resurrecting
the Value of Love in Contemporary Jurisprudence, 82 GEo. L.J. 1431 (1994).
169. See Thomas L. Shaffer, Lawyers as Prophets, 15 ST. THOMAs L. REv. 469, 469-71, 477-78
(2003). See generally Thomas L. Shaffer, Lawyers and the Biblical Prophets, 17 NOTRE DAME J.L.
ETmcs & PUB. PoL'Y 521, 521 (2003) ("Much of what admirable lawyer-heroes have done ... has been
prophetic in the biblical sense ..... ); Thomas L. Shaffer, Towering Figures, Enigmas, and Responsive
Communities in American Legal Ethics, 51 ME. L. REv. 229 (1999) (discussing communitarian legal
ethics).
170. REGAN, supra note 1, at 54 (quoting Bob O'Hara, Milbank partner).
171. On the relationship between law and social norms, and their impact on behavior and change,
see Eic PosNER, LAW AND SocIAL NoRMs (2000); Melvin A. Eisenberg, Corporate Law and Social
Norms, 99 COLUM. L. REv. 1253 (1999); Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and
Deterrence, 83 VA. L. REv. 349 (1997); Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and
Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH. L. REv. 338 (1997).
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lawyers and the societal disappointment in their ethical regulation. Simon ties
this professional and popular disenchantment to the shallow moral aspiration
and stunted social role of lawyers. 1 7 2 Disenchantment comes from inside the
profession, in the clamoring of bar associations and courts, and from outside, in
the reproof of insurance carriers and legislative bodies. 17 3 Both role and aspira-
tional constraints gain unfortunate reinforcement from state bar codes and
disciplinary doctrines. The heart of that limitation lies with the meaning of
legality and justice.
Simon attributes a crabbed vision of legality and justice to the overarching
commitment to client loyalty in conventional views of ethics and lawyering.
That categorical imperative narrows the nature and purpose of law and the legal
system to a moral terrain unmindful of third party and public interests. On this
terrain, ethical conventions confine decisionmaking to a restricted range of
problem-solving considerations. This fixed range prescribes a small number of
factors appropriate for ethical evaluation. Beyond that range of legitimate
factors, decisionmakers exert no discretion. 17 4 In this way, conventional decision-
making defines ethical legitimacy not in the discretionary consideration of
other-regarding interests concerning legality and justice, but rather in the client-
promoting pursuit of "any goal ... through any arguably legal course of ac-
tion,"175 and its corollary principle of lawyer self-aggrandizement.
Risk management norms operate in a similarly constrained fashion. Installed
to control risk and prevent loss, they dictate a variety of administrative and
management techniques for minimizing legal liability. 17 6 The assessment of risk
combines technical and moral calibrations. Applied broadly, the calibrations
seek to measure and mitigate risk-taking conduct, shifting and spreading its
consequences over participants and affected populations. Predominantly utilitar-
ian, risk classifications assign moral blame' 7 7 and create moral opportunity. 78
That opportunity engenders both moral risk17 ' and responsibility. 80 Character-
172. See SIMON, supra note 9, at 1-4; William H. Simon, Ethical Discretion in Lawyering, 101
HARv. L. REv. 1083 (1988) (sketching a theory of ethical discretion in lawyer decisionmaking).
173. See Anthony E. Davis, Professional Liability Insurers as Regulators of Law Practice, 65
FoRDHAM L. REv. 209, 211-19 (1996) (discussing how professional liability insurance augments
existing ethical rules or creates new classes of restricted conduct); Charles Silver, Professional Liability
Insurance as Insurance and as Lawyer Regulation: Response to Davis, 65 FoRDHAM L. REV. 233,
234-41 (1996).
174. SIMON, supra note 9, at 8-9.
175. Simon, supra note 172, at 1085.
176. See John D. Graham, Legislative Approaches to Achieving More Protection Against Risk at
Less Cost, 1997 U. Cm. LEGAL F. 13, 14-16 (1997) (discussing how people handle the everyday
dimensions of risk); James G. March & Zur Shapira, Managerial Perspectives on Risk and Risk Taking,
33 MGMT. Sci. 1404, 1410-11 (1987) (showing how business managers avoid risk rather than accept it).
177. See Tom Baker, Containing the Promise of Insurance: Adverse Selection and Risk Classifica-
tion, in RISK AND MORALITY 258, 262-63 (Richard V. Ericson & Aaron Doyle eds., 2003).
178. See Jonathan Simon, Risking Rescue: High Altitude Rescue as Moral Risk and Moral Opportu-
nity, in RISK AND MORALITY, supra note 177, at 375, 399-401.
179. For analyses on moral hazard in different contexts, see CAROL HEIMER, REACrIVE RISK AND
RATIONAL AcnON: MANAGING MoRAL HAZARD IN INSURANCE CoNTRAcrs 28-48 (1985); Tom Baker, On
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centered accounts of such responsibility afford new forms of institutional
governance and social regulation. s8
The moral utilitarianism of risk management surfaces in modeling systems
for business,182 finance, insurance, 184 and medicine. 85 It also inheres in tort
law,18 6 particularly medical malpractice 8 7 and lawyer malpractice.' 88 Engrafted
from business enterprise models" 9 to ameliorate the deteriorating bonds of law
firm culture,' 90 utilitarian calculations account for salutary developments in
the Genealogy of Moral Hazard, 75 Tx. L. REV. 237 (1996); Seth J. Chandler, The Interaction of the
Tort System and Liability Insurance Regulation: Understanding Moral Hazard, 2 CONN. INS. L.J. 91
(1996); Deborah A. Stone, Beyond Moral Hazard: Insurance as Moral Opportunity, 6 CONN. INs. L.J.
11(1999).
180. See EMBRACING RISK: THE CHANGING CULTURE OF INSURANCE AND RESPONSIBILITY (Tom Baker &
Jonathan Simon eds., 2002).
181. For skeptical accounts of corporate governance trends, see William S. Laufer, Corporate
Liability, Risk Shifting, and the Paradox of Compliance, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1343 (1999); Robert Eli
Rosen, Risk Management and Corporate Governance: The Case of Enron, 35 CONN. L. REV. 1157
(2003); David A. Skeel Jr., Creditors' Ball: The 'New' New Corporate Governance in Chapter 11, 152
U. PA. L. REV. 917 (2003).
182. See 2 BETTY VAN DER SMISSEN, LEGAL LIABILITY AND RISK MANAGEMENT FOR PUBLIC AND PRIVATE
ENTrrES ch. 23, 1-18 (1990). See generally THOMAs L. BARTON ET AL., MAKING ENTERPRISE RISK
MANAGEMENT PAY OFF (2002) (studying enterprise-wide risk management in businesses).
183. See generally George S. Oldfield & Anthony M. Santomero, Risk Management in Financial
Institutions, 39 SLOAN MGMT. REv. 33 (1997).
184. See Jeffrey S. Grange, Risk Management and the "Rogue" Trader: Trading-Related Losses,
Director & Officer Liability, Prudent Risk Management, Insurance Risk Transfer the Role of Education,
69 FoRDHAM L. REv. 329, 332-33 (2000); Neil D. Levin, Insurance Supervision Meets the Marketplace:
The Regulatory Response to Derivatives as a Risk Management Tool in the Insurance Industry, 69
FORDHAM L. REV. 17, 17 (2000).
185. See Bryan A. Liang, The Effectiveness of Physician Risk Management: Potential Problems for
Patient Safety, 5 RISK DECISION & POLICY 183, 194-99 (2000). See generally DAVID E. MARCINKO,
INSURANCE AND RISK MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES FOR PHYSICIANS AND ADVISORS (2005); Frank V. Lefevre et
al., A Survey of Physician Training Programs in Risk Management and Communication Skills for
Malpractice Prevention, 28 J.L. Med. & Ethics 258 (2000).
186. See Tom Baker, Blood Money, New Money, and the Moral Economy of Tort Law in Action, 35
LAW & Soc'Y REv. 275, 285 (2001); A.G. Celli, Jr., Note, Toward a Risk Contribution Approach to
Tortfeasor Identification and Multiple Causation Cases, 65 N.Y.U. L. REv. 635, 636-37 (1990); Gary T.
Schwartz, The Ethics and the Economics of Tort Liability Insurance, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 313, 314-15
(1990).
187. See Tom Baker, Medical Malpractice and the Insurance Underwriting Cycle, 54 DEPAUL L.
REV. 393, 396-98 (2005); Sarah Guyton, An Institutional Perspective on the Medical Malpractice
Crisis, 13 ANNALS HEALTH L. 571, 573-75 (2004).
188. See John Leubsdorf, Legal Malpractice and Professional Responsibility, 48 RUTGERs L. REV.
101, 102-04 (1995); Manuel R. Ramos, Legal Malpractice: No Lawyer or Client Is Safe, 47 FLA. L.
REV. 1, 3-5 (1995); Manuel R. Ramos, Legal Malpractice: Reforming Lawyers and Low Professors, 70
TuL. L. REV. 2583, 2586-88 (1996); Manuel R. Ramos, Legal Malpractice: The Profession's Dirty
Little Secret, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1657, 1663-65 (1994).
189. On the intersection of business and legal ethics, see Rob Atkinson, Connecting Business Ethics
and Legal Ethics for the Common Good: Come, Let Us Reason Together, 29 J. CORP. L. 469, 510-24
(2004); Rob Atkinson, Growing Greener Grass: Looking From Legal Ethics to Business Ethics, and
Back, 1 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 951, 960-81 (2004).
190. On moral decay in law firm culture, see Patrick J. Schiltz, Legal Ethics in Decline: The Elite
Law Firm, the Elite Law School, and the Moral Formation of the Novice Attorney, 82 MINN. L. REV.
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internal controls,' 91 supervision,19 2 and in-house advisory structures.193 Like-
wise, they contribute to considerations of law firm discipline' 94 and partner
expulsion.' 9 5
Carefully mapped, risk management approaches for lawyers and law firms
extend to malpractice insurance, 19 6 loss prevention, 97 and institutional infrastruc-
ture.' 98 Characterized by firm-wide or practice-wide policies and procedures
"designed to minimize risk,"' 99 risk management systems establish best practice
protocols to control factors that regularly lead to malpractice claims and ethics
complaints. Law practice management consultants, for example, point to con-
flicts of interest as a recurrent risk factor creating malpractice exposure for a
firm. Management consultants recommend firm-wide risk avoidance strategies,
warning about the peril of "eat-what-you-kill" compensation systems that encour-
705, 720-46 (1998); William J. Wernz, The Ethics of Large Law Firms-Responses and Reflections, 16
GEO. J. LEGAL Erncs 175, 186-97 (2005).
191. See Colleen L. Rest, Electronic Mail and Confidential Client-Attorney Communications: Risk
Management, 48 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 309, 310-12 (1998).
192. See Irwin D. Miller, Preventing Misconduct by Promoting the Ethics of Attorneys' Supervisory
Duties, 70 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 259, 275-76 (1994).
193. See Elizabeth Chambliss & David B. Wilkins, The Emerging Role of Ethics Advisors, General
Counsel, and Other Compliance Specialists in Large Law Firms, 44 ARIz. L. REV. 559, 565 (2002);
Jonathan M. Epstein, The In-House Ethics Advisor Practical Benefits for the Modern Law Firm, 7 GEO.
J. LEGAL Emcs 1011, 1012 (1994); Peter R. Jarvis & Mark J. Fucile, Inside an In-House Legal Ethics
Practice, 14 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETmcs & Pus. PoL'Y 103, 104-06 (2000); Peter J. Winders, Law Firm
General Counsel Extravagance or Necessity?, 15 PROF. LAW. 1 (2005).
194. See Note, Collective Sanctions and Large Law Firm Discipline, 118 HARv. L. REv. 2336
(2005); see also Elizabeth Chambliss & David B. Wilkins, A New Framework for Law Firm Discipline,
16 GEO. J. LEGAL Emcs 335, 335-36 (2003).
195. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The Underlying Causes of Withdrawal and Expulsion of Partners
from Law Firms, 55 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1073, 1073-75 (1998).
196. See Susan Saab Fortney, Legal Malpractice Insurance: Surviving the Perfect Storm, 28 J.
LEGAL PROF. 41, 43-45 (2004); Frederic L. Goldfein, Legal Malpractice Insurance, 61 T1bw. L. REV.
1285, 1285-86 (1988); Andrew S. Hanen & Jett Hanna, Legal Malpractice Insurance: Exclusions,
Selected Coverage and Consumer Issues, 33 S. TEx. L. REv. 75, 77-78 (1992); Jett Hanna, Legal
Malpractice Insurance and Limited Liability Entities: An Analysis of Malpractice Risk and Underwrit-
ing Responses, 39 S. TEx. L. REV. 641, 641-44 (1998).
197. For a look at loss prevention and malpractice generally, see Mark Bassingthwaighte, Insurance
Show and Tell: Make Sure Your Malpractice Carrier Knows About Your Firm's Loss Prevention Efforts,
89 A.B.A. J. 36 (2003); George M. Cohen, Legal Malpractice Insurance and Loss Prevention: A
Comparative Analysis of Economic Institutions, 4 CONN. INs. L.J. 305 (1997).
198. See Elizabeth Chambliss & David B. Wilkins, Promoting Effective Ethical Infrastructure in
Large Law Firms: A Call for Research and Reporting, 30 HOFsTRA L. REv. 691, 697 (2002); see also
Ted Schneyer, A Tale of Four Systems: Reflections on How Law Influences the "Ethical Infrastructure"
of Law Firms, 39 S. TEx. L. REv. 245 (1998).
199. ANTHONY E. DAVIS, RISK MANAGEMENT: SuRvIvAL TOOLS FOR LAW FIRMS 16 (1995). Davis
defines "risk" in terms of "any danger that, if not controlled, may lead to any consequence unintended
by and actually or potentially harmful to a law firm or practitioner." Id. at 15; see also John A.
Edginton, Managing Lawyers' Risks at the Millennium, 73 TUL. L. REv. 1987, 1989-90 (1999)
(outlining risk management principles for law firms); William H. Fortune & Dulaney O'Roark, Risk
Management for Lawyers, 45 S.C. L. REV. 617, 618-19 (1994) (suggesting that lawyers "manage ...
risk by practicing defensive law"); Bao Q. Tran & Jonathan P. Tomes, Risk Analysis: Your Key to
Compliance, ACC DocKET, Nov.-Dec. 2003, at 38-54 (discussing how to assess risk and review such
assessments).
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age the hoarding of work and discourage the mentoring of young lawyers, and
admonishing that a firm culture of distrust breeds a stressful working environ-
ment and fuels lawyer burnout. 20
Unsurprisingly, risk management consultants make little mention of the
potentially adverse or undesirable consequences of law firm-based loss preven-
tion systems. Like other public and private risk assessment and management
technologies, firm loss prevention systems work to identify, measure, and
reduce risk-taking and loss-producing behavior embedded in the litigation and
transactional routines of practice.2 01 Tom Baker adverts to this mundane, embed-
ded quality in describing the "complex, relational nature of risk."20 2 More
broadly, both Baker and Jonathan Simon point to the use of risk narratives in the
social construction of practice organizations and environents203 --here the
tournament environment of large law firm competition, practice group expecta-
tion, and deal team motivation to accrue greater profit and revenue.
Consistent with the work of Baker and Simon, the rhetoric and technology of
risk management constructs the social reality of large law firm practice by
reframing individual and collective incentives for ethically responsible conduct.
By altering compliance incentives, risk management technologies can prevent
as well as promote risk-taking and loss-causing behavior. In acknowledging this
causal relation, Baker and Simon neither exaggerate the incentive effects nor
underestimate the ethical or social benefits of risk management. Both incentive
effects and social benefits determine the performative role and goal of risk
management. Incentive effects include cynically disguising mercantile tourna-
ment commitments in loss prevention rhetoric, irresponsibly designing manage-
ment technologies to tempt risk-taking behavior, and overstating Babbitry-like
claims of utility.2 04 Social benefits include practicality,205 collaboration, 2 0 6 and
decisional clarity.207
No catalogue of incentive effects or positive externalities will prove that law
firms can effectively manage ethical risks. Additionally, no catalogue will prove
200. See Suzanne Rose, Risk Management: Is the Culture of Your Firm Inviting Malpractice or
Ethics Violations?, 41 TEN. B.J. 22, 23-24 (2005) (counseling law firms on risk avoidance through
culture modification).
201. See Tom Baker & Jonathan Simon, Embracing Risk, in EMBRACING RISK: THE CHANGING
CULTURE OF INSURANCE AND RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 180, at 1-25.
202. Baker, supra note 179, at 289.
203. See Tom Baker & Jonathan Simon, Embracing Risk, in EMBRACING RISK: THE CHANGING
CULTURE OF INSURANCE AND RESPONSIBILTY, supra note 180, at 18.
204. See William H. Simon, The Ethics Teacher's Bittersweet Revenge, 94 GEo. L.J. 1985 (2006).
Incentive effects may also implicate moral hazard. For Baker, "'moral hazard' refers to the tendency for
insurance against loss to reduce incentives to prevent or minimize the cost of loss." Baker, supra note
184, at 239. Without more, it is unclear whether risk management systems create moral hazard by
encouraging or tempting "good people to do wrong" Id. at 241.
205. Simon, supra note 204, at 1987 ("Risk management forces attention to practical consequences
of professional responsibility decisions, at least insofar as consequences are measured by liability.").
206. Id. at 1988 ("The risk management view is resolutely collaborative.").
207. Id. at 1990 ("[L]ike ethics teaching, risk management encourages clear articulation of ethical
decisions.").
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that firm management procedures can cause harmful or beneficial consequences.
And surely no catalogue will prove that such consequences warrant the abandon-
ment of individual lawyer fault and collective firm responsibility for miscon-
duct. Yet the idea of "governing through risk" remains compelling in the
literature of insurance and law office management. To Baker and Simon, "the
core idea of governing through risk is the use of formal considerations about
risk to direct organizational strategy and resources."2 08
Regan's case study of the Bucyrus representation illustrates the dangers
attendant to formal and informal considerations of risk regulation in large law
firm governance. In undertaking the dual representation of Bucyrus and
Salovaara-South Street in spite of potentially adverse and materially limiting
conflicts of interest, Milbank breached its fiduciary duties to Bucyrus by failing
to make reasonable efforts to establish and to enforce ethics rule-mandated
internal firm policies and procedures designed to detect and resolve directly
adverse and materially limiting conflicts of interest.2 0 9 Furthermore, Milbank
breached its fiduciary duties by failing to provide reasonable assurance that all
lawyers in the firm conformed to the rules of ethics.2 10
ABA Model Rule 5.1 regulates the responsibilities of firm partners, manag-
ers, and supervisory lawyers. 1 1 Section (a) of Rule 5.1 mandates reasonable
efforts by partners and other lawyers possessing comparable managerial author-
ity in a law firm to ensure that their firm has in effect measures giving
reasonable assurance that all lawyers conform to applicable ethics rules. Section
(b) mandates reasonable efforts by a supervisory lawyer, here Lederman as
corporate practice group leader, to ensure that other lawyers, Gellene and the
Milbank legal team, conform to such rules. Section (c) mandates reasonable
remedial action when the lawyer "knows of the conduct at a time when its
consequences can be avoided or mitigated." 2 12
The Comment to Rule 5.1 points out that "[i]n a large firm, or in practice
situations in which intensely difficult ethical problems frequently arise, more
elaborate procedures may be necessary." 2 13 Under Rule 5.1, Milbank's partners,
managers, and supervisory lawyers could not assume that Lederman, Gellene,
or any other member of the Bucyrus legal team would inevitably conform to the
rules. Because "the ethical atmosphere of a firm can influence the conduct of all
208. See Baker & Simon, supra note 180, at 11.
209. See REGAN, supra note 1, at 215-16.
210. See id. at 314-24.
211. See MODEL RuLEs OF PROF'L CoNDucr R. 5.1 (2004); see also MODEL CODE OF PROF'L
RESPONSIBILYTY DR 1-102 & DR 1-103(A) (1983); RESTATEMENT (TURD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING
LAWYERS § 121 cmt. g (2000) ("For the purpose of identifying conflicts of interest, a lawyer should
have reasonable procedures, appropriate for the size and type of firm and practice, to detect conflicts of
interest, including procedures to determine in both litigation and nonlitigation matters the parties and
interests involved in each representation."); ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Formal
Op. 96-401 (1996) (citing lawyer supervisory obligations under Rule 5.1).
212. See MODEL RULEs OF PROF'L CoNDucr R. 5.1 (2004).
213. See MODEL RuLEs OF PROF'L CoNDucr R. 5.1 cmt. 3 (2004).
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its members," each of Milbank's partners, managers, and supervisory lawyers
had at least indirect responsibility for all work being done by the firm.214
The Bucyrus representation signals Milbank's institutional failure to establish
conflict of interest oversight and enforcement procedures, and Milbank lawyers'
individual abdication of their supervisory responsibilities. That failure resulted
in the impermissible dual representation of Bucyrus and Salovaarit-South Street.
Neither Larry Lederman nor Toni Lichstein, nor any other Milbank partners,
managers, or supervisory lawyers, intervened to halt that dual representation or
interceded to audit Gellene's former or current corporate clients for similar
disqualifying conflicts.2 15 Milbank's failure to establish and enforce internal
firm policies and procedures designed to detect and resolve directly adverse and
materially limiting conflicts of interest, its failure to provide reasonable assur-
ance that all lawyers in the firm conformed to the rules, and its failure to take
reasonable remedial action to prevent disqualifying conflicts of interest in their
dual representation violated axiomatic ethics rules and the basic tenets of risk
management.
Standing alone, however, risk management tools would not have saved
Milbank's Bucyrus representation from ethical censure. Perversely, risk manage-
ment systems may actually imperil lawyer ethical judgment and moral reason-
ing. Oftentimes those systems put lawyer moral decisionmaking in jeopardy by
shifting responsibility for hard normative judgments to others inside the firm
bureaucracy, such as in-house ethics advisors and committees. By diminishing a
lawyer's individual responsibility for making moral choices about his role in
law and society, firm-devised risk spreading systems may induce a kind of
moral apathy. Institutional indifference to the daily necessity of individual
discretion in determining the scope of lawyer obligation to clients, third parties,
and the public inhibits moral development and hobbles professional indepen-
dence.216
Furthermore, wedded to categorical styles of ethical decisionmaking, risk
management systems urge lawyers to vindicate client interests at the expense of
underlying legal merit. Vindication prompts judgments based on concrete client-
centered norms applied narrowly to the particular facts of a case. Under this
constricted logic, the promotion of justice, and the corresponding elevation of
system-wide procedural and substantive norms, diverges from the pursuit of
client private goals.
The systemic preference for private values in risk management regulation
undermines the aspirational tradition of legal professionalism. That tradition
honors fidelity to law and to a greater ideal of public justice in addressing legal
ethics problems. Simon points to recurring analytic tensions in distinguishing
214. See id.
215. See generally REGAN, supra note 1.
216. See Milton C. Regan, Jr., Risky Business, 94 GEO. L.J. 1957, 1966 (2006) ("[C]onceptualizing
ethics as a matter of avoiding liability can influence [personal] dispositions, attitudes, and motives, and
therefore how someone exercises her discretion."); SIMON, supra note 9, at 109-37.
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substance from procedure, purpose from form, and broad from narrow framing
in resolving ethics problems.21 These tensions are aggravated by the thin norms
of justice and legal merit embedded in legal ethics codes.
Ethics codes, Simon laments, furnish neither a substantive yardstick for
evaluating legal merit nor a procedural compass for conducting that evaluation.
Absent a merit-based substantive benchmark and an alternative procedural
matrix, the codes rely on formal, narrowly tailored issue-framing methodologies
to reach decisions. Reliance precludes the contextual formulation of a decision-
making method combining substantive purpose, pragmatism, and particularized
fact. An interpretive method of this sort, Simon asserts, harnesses lawyer
knowledge to substantive law. The institutionalization of that "high-commit-
ment lawyering" method requires an enforcement structure built from contex-
tual norms, strengthened by voluntary rule commitments, and supervised by bar
associations, courts, legislatures, and public regulatory agencies.2 18 Most impor-
tant, it requires the exercise of lawyer discretion.
Discretion suffers under law firm risk management systems. Designed to
prevent loss and minimize liability for law firms, the systems produce both
moral risk and opportunity for lawyers. Moral risk, whether displayed in amoral
or ethically risk-taking behavior, emerges from a mix of lethargy and utilitarian-
ism. Lethargy marks lawyer overreliance on firm risk management systems. The
morally lethargic lawyer is a kind of free rider, enjoying the benefits of risk
management systems without contributing to their substantive content, enforce-
ment, or maintenance. Utilitarianism elevates private client loyalty over public
and professionalism values. The morally utilitarian lawyer exploits under-
inclusive gaps in risk management systems to advance client interests at the
expense of public accountability and professional compliance. And yet, when
grounded in the norms of legality and justice, risk management systems also
furnish lawyers with the moral opportunity to exercise discretion on behalf of
higher values. The next section examines the substance of discretionary norms.
IV. DISCRETIONARY NoRMs
"[Y]ou just couldn't imagine it ....
The integration of discretionary norms into conventional risk management
systems seeks to enhance traditions of lawyer accountability independent of
disciplinary or regulatory law enforcement. Internal to practice and the rhetoric
of professionalism, discretionary norms draw from the resources of the law
itself, chiefly legality and justice. Simon's justice-seeking version of discretion
in lawyering involves purposive and practical judgments about case selection
217. See SmuoN, supra note 9, at 138-69.
218. See id. at 205. For earlier, less amenable accounts of Simon's jurisprudence, see Anthony V.
Alfieri, (Er)Raceing an Ethic ofJustice, 51 STAN. L. REV. 935 (1999); Anthony V. Alfieri, Impoverished
Practices, 81 GEo. L.J. 2567, 2619-29 (1993).
219. REGAN, supra note 1, at 368 (quoting David Goelzer).
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and strategy. Predicated on qualified conceptions of autonomy from state author-
ity and the dominant legal order, the judgments connect case selection and
strategy to the promotion of legality and justice. Both conceptions of autonomy
imply the exercise of lawyer discretion.22 0
Simon's discretionary approach to ethical decisionmaking enables lawyers to
refuse legally permissible courses of action and to rebuff potentially enforceable
legal claims. 2 2 1 Tied to reflective judgment, this twin rebuke turns on a concur-
rent assessment of the merits of a client's claims relative to the merits of third
party claims joined with or adjacent to the representation. Reconciliation of the
conflicting merits of competing client and third party goals is integral to this
assessment. Considerations of justice remain basic to that reconciliation.2 22
Simon links ethical discretion to the traditional ambition of direct lawyer
participation in the elaboration and implementation of legality and justice.
Redeeming that ambition requires independence from client goals and state
laws sufficient to vindicate legal merit and justice.2 23 Vindication depends on
the relevant circumstances of the particular case. Particularized by design,
discretionary norms address the complexity of client case goals with the flexibil-
ity of judicial decisionmaking. Accustomed to multiparty and multiclaim con-
texts, that style of decisionmaking entails practical judgments about the internal
and relative merit of competing claims and goals.22 4 Pragmatic in nature, the
judgments first assess the extent to which a client's goals and claims are
grounded in the law. Next, the judgments consider the interests at stake,
especially the extent to which the representation may equalize access to the
legal system. For Simon, the sensitivity of this interest analysis to the unequal
distribution of legal services in society permits a good faith accounting of
relative merit.225
Judgments of internal merit, by comparison, warrant the evaluation of conflict-
ing legal values implicated directly in a client's claim or goal. Variable in form,
legal value conflicts display the previously mentioned tensions found in the
clash between substance and procedure, and in the contest between overbroad
and narrow framing. Like Cover,22 6 Simon cautiously delegates responsibility
for such conflict resolution to state decisionmakers, invoking the lawyer duty to
intervene if bias or incompetence infects the state decisionmaking process.2 27
To both Cover and Simon, the strongest assurance of a just decisionmaking
process is the soundness of its dispute resolution procedure.2 2 8 The value of
220. See Simon, Ethical Discretion in Lawyering, supra note 172, at 1083-84.
221. See id. at 1083.
222. See id. at 1083, 1091.
223. See id. at 1144.
224. See id. at 1090-91.
225. See id. at 1093-94.
226. See COVER, supra note 163, at 201-56.
227. See Simon, Ethical Discretion in Lawyering, supra note 172, at 1096-98.
228. See SIMON, supra note 9, at 139-40.
2006] 1941
THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL
process compels reasonable intervention to render applicable procedure effec-
tive and to forego disruption of its operation. Triggered by ineffective or unjust
procedure, this interventionist duty confers direct responsibility on the lawyer
for the substantive validity of the decision at stake. That duty, Simon explains,
requires difficult judgments about the purpose and form of procedural rules. The
clearer the relevant purposes, the more binding their grip on the lawyer.2 29
The definitional frameworks of competing claims and goals guide discretion-
ary judgments of procedural purpose and form. The broad and narrow framing
of an issue, take for example conflicts of interest in bankruptcy reorganization,
contributes to party and third party perception of adversity and to the chances of
negotiated or adjudicated resolution. Simon gives lawyers responsibility for
determining the broad or narrow framing of the issues in a particular case,
announcing general standards of relevance to guide that framing. The standards
include interpretive plausibility, practical impact, knowledge, and institutional
competence.230 Applied to the Bucyrus bankruptcy, the standards suggest both
the interpretive implausibility of Gellene's narrow conflict framing and the
adverse practical impact of his dual representation on debtor and creditor
perception of the integrity of the bankruptcy process. Milbank lacked the
institutional competence to rescue that process.
The deep commitment to the legal values of merit, substance, procedure, and
purpose grounding Simon's discretionary approach facilitates lawyer good faith
judgments about legality and justice in advocacy and counseling. The Bucyrus
bankruptcy shows that a lack of good faith by Gellene and a scarcity of client
commitment by Salovaara-South Street to the norms of legality and justice
undercut the legitimacy of lawyer discretion. Obtaining that commitment through
lawyer-client or joint client-client normative consensus seems unlikely in the
Bucyrus context of intense party conflict between Salovaara-South Street and
JNL. Entrenched party discord also condemns republican appeal to communal
dialogue and deliberation of the common good.2 31
Simon's emphasis on the legal values of internal merit and goal selection
illustrates the danger of Gellene's unrelenting ends-orientation to ethical decision-
making. By discarding relative merit, that orientation abandoned the pursuit of
consensus and legality. From the standpoint of discretion, Gellene possessed the
capacity to frustrate the goals of both clients and third parties. For Simon, that
legitimate capacity empowers lawyer infringement on client claim and goal
autonomy. The path to infringement is carved from the jurisprudence of balanc-
ing. Lawyer balancing of legal interests in the Bucyrus bankruptcy and else-
where offers a pragmatic method of resolving countervailing categorical claims
of loyalty, legality, and justice. Fundamental to lawyer normative judgment, the
effective balancing of categorical norms requires conditions of reasoned, cooper-
229. See Simon, supra note 172, at 1103.
230. See id. at 1108-09.
231. Long-run claims of justice fail to revive this republican appeal. See SmoN, supra note 9, at 53-76.
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ative, and inclusive deliberation in the interests of legality and justice.
Gellene and Milbank breached their deliberative duties to Bucyrus and
consequently failed to act in Bucyrus's best interest as a financially distressed
entity. Each failed to warn Bucyrus's board of directors of directly adverse and
materially limiting conflicts of interest, and failed to counsel the board on the
appropriate resolution of such conflicts. Moreover, each failed to explain client
identity to Bucyrus's constituent directors, officers, and creditor shareholders,
and failed to counsel Bucyrus to obtain independent representation.2 32
ABA Model Rule 1.13 regulates the representation of an entity organization
as client.23 3 Section (a) of Rule 1.13 posits that a lawyer retained by an
organization represents the organization acting through its duly authorized
constituents.2 34 Section (b) mandates that the lawyer for an organization pro-
ceed as is reasonably necessary in the best interest of the organization. This duty
applies when the lawyer knows that a constituent director, officer, or share-
holder "is engaged in action, intends to act or refuses to act in a matter related to
the representation that is a violation of a legal obligation to the organization, or
a violation of law that reasonably might be imputed to the organization, and that
is likely to result in substantial injury to the organization."2 35 Remedial mea-
sures include referring the matter to a higher authority or, when sufficiently
serious, to the highest authority in the organization, ordinarily the board of
directors.236 The Comment to Rule 1.13 notes that "[t]he organization's highest
authority to whom a matter may be referred ordinarily will be the board of
directors or similar governing body," adding that "under certain conditions
highest authority reposes elsewhere, for example, in the independent directors
of a corporation."23 7 Section (f) regulates the identification of the client. It
directs the lawyer in dealing with an organization's directors, officers, and
shareholders to "explain the identity of the client when the lawyer knows or
reasonably should know that the organization's interests are adverse to those of
the constituents with whom the lawyer is dealing."2 38
The Comment to Rule 1.13 adds, that in circumstances of organization-
constituent adversity, "the lawyer should advise any constituent, whose interest
the lawyer finds adverse to that of the organization of the conflict or potential
232. REGAN, supra note 1, at 71-172.
233. See MODEL RULmS OF PROF'L CoNDucr R. 1.13 (2004); see also MODEL CODE OF PROF'L
REsPONSIBILrY EC 5-18 & 5-24 (1983) (discussing the responsibilities of a lawyer retained or
employed by a corporation); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS §§ 16, 49, 96 &
131 (2000) (discussing a lawyer's duties to a client in general, breach of fiduciary duty, representation
of organizations, and conflicts of interest in representing organizations, respectively). See generally
ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 92-365 (1992) (discussing conflicts of
interest in representing trade associations as clients); ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'1 Responsibility,
Formal Op. 91-361 (1991) (discussing representation of a partnership).
234. MODEL RuLEs OF PROF'L CoNDucr R. 1.13(a) (2004).
235. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDucr R. 1.13(b) (2004).
236. See id.
237. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CoNDucr R. 1.13 cmt. 5 (2004).
238. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CoNDucr R. 1.13(f) (2004).
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conflict of interest, that the lawyer cannot represent such constituent and that
such person may wish to obtain independent representation." 2 3 9 The lawyer's
issuance of a constituent adversity warning hinges on the facts of each case.
Section (g) regulates the dual representation of an organization and its constitu-
ent directors, officers, and shareholders.24 0 It conditions dual organization-
constituent representation on the conflict-of-interest provisions of Rule 1.7.
When, as here, Rule 1.7 requires the organization's consent, section (g) de-
mands that "the consent shall be given by an appropriate official of the
organization other than the individual who is to be represented, or by the
shareholders." 241
Gellene and Milbank compounded their breach of deliberative duties under
Rule 1.13 by failing to decline or withdraw from the representation of Bucyrus.
Simultaneous with Rules 1.7 and 1.13, Rule 1.16 regulates declining and
terminating representation.24 2 Section (a) of the rule determines when a lawyer
must decline24 3 or terminate2 44 representation.24 5 It prohibits a lawyer from
representing a client and, where representation has commenced, compels a
lawyer to withdraw from representing a client if the representation will result in
violation of an ethics rule or law.24 6 The Comment to Rule 1.16 underlines that
a lawyer should not accept representation in a matter unless it can be performed
competently and without improper conflicts of interest.24 7
The collective misjudgments of Gellene and Milbank violated their fiduciary
duties of care, competence, and undivided loyalty to Bucyrus. Regan views
these misjudgments as a kind of myopia induced by tournament competition,
corporate practice insularity, and transactional team allegiance.24 8 Conceding
disturbing patterns of negligence and dishonesty in Gellene's character, he
closely scrutinizes the predecessor and successor events surrounding the Bucyrus
bankruptcy. In predecessor events, he discerns a lack of candor and collegiality
239. MODEL RULEs OF PROF'L CoNDucr R. 1.13 cmt. 10 (2004).
240. MODEL RuLEs OF PROF'L CoNDucr R. 1.13(e) (2004).
241. Id.
242. MODEL RuLEs OF PROF'L CoNDUcr R. 1.16 (2004).
243. Under Model Rule 1.7, a conflict of interest may exist prior to representation. In that event, the
rule directs declination of the representation, unless the lawyer obtains the informed consent of each
client. The rule recommends the adoption of reasonable firm-wide procedures, appropriate for the size
and type of firm practice, to determine the persons and issues embroiled in both litigation and
nonlitigation conflicts. MODEL RuLEs OF PROF'L CoNDucr R. 1.7 cmt. 3 (2004).
244. Alternatively, under Model Rule 1.7, a conflict may arise subsequent to representation. In such
event, the rule ordinarily directs withdrawal from the representation, unless the lawyer obtains the
informed consent of the client. MODEL RuLEs OF PROF'L CoNDucr R. 1.7 cmt. 4 (2004).
245. MODEL RuLEs OF PROF'L CoNDucr R. 1.16(a) (2004).
246. Id.
247. MODEL RuLEs OF PROF'L CoNDucr R. 1.16 cmt. 1 (2004); see also MODEL CODE OF PROF'L
REsPONSIBRniY DR 2-109(A), DR 2-110(A)-(C) (1983) (discussing acceptance of and withdrawal from
employment); RESTATEMENT (THm) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS §§ 31-32 (2000). See generally
ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'1 Responsibility, Formal Op. 92-366 (1992) (discussing withdrawal
when a lawyer's services will otherwise be used to perpetrate a fraud).
248. REGAN, supra note 1, at 37-41, 298.
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demonstrated by Gellene's delinquent and retrospective reconstruction of his
billing records, his shunning of mentoring responsibilities related to Milbank's
summer associate program, and his nine-year long misrepresentation of his New
York and federal bar memberships to Milbank and the Wisconsin bankruptcy
court.2 49 In successor events, Regan detects repeated misrepresentations in
Gellene's colloquy with Judge Eisenberg regarding Milbank's misleading disclo-
sure of its firm partners' ownership interest in litigation-related transportation
fees, his false statement to a Colorado bankruptcy court regarding discovery
noncompliance in connection with the Busse Broadcasting Corporation debt
purchase transaction, his intentional alteration of opposing counsel's affidavit
accompanying JNL's disgorgement motion, and his deceptive denials to Mil-
bank partners concerning receipt of the JNL motion.25 0
Evaluating these events cumulatively, Regan identifies equal evidence of
defensive dishonesty and active material deceit in Gellene's conduct. He at-
tributes these errors of judgments to both character and circumstance. At the
same time, he acknowledges that Gellene paid little heed to legality and justice
norms, preferring crabbed readings of his categorical duties. To capture Gellene's
moral universe, Regan situates his personal character in the broader context of
the newly volatile market of large law firm practice. Within a highly competive
legal services market where law firms, practice groups, and transactional teams
struggle to attract and retain clients, Regan asserts, the moral probity of
individual lawyers becomes entwined with the corrosive formal and informal
dynamics of multiple ethical environments.25 '
In Gellene's case, this entwining of the individual and his environment, of
character and circumstance, spiraled downward out of a calculated strategy by
Milbank to invigorate its corporate transactional practice to exploit the surging
demand for corporate bankruptcy representation. Like comparable Wall Street
firms, Milbank recognized that its strategic maneuver risked conflicts of interest
with former and current corporate clients, as well as doctrinal quarrels with
bankruptcy courts in states less tolerant of debtor-creditor conflicts.2 52 Milbank
also realized that its lateral recruitment and elevation of "rainmaker" partners
like Lederman drastically altered the culture of the firm.2 53
Nonetheless, Regan declines to attribute the Bucyrus debacle solely to the
249. Id. at 53-54, 60-62. In 1989, Milbank discovered that Gellene had neglected to acquire
membership in the New York state bar and the federal bar, delaying his licensing for almost nine years,
despite his assertions to the contrary. As a consequence, Milbank removed Gellene as a partner,
reinstating him only after the state bar conducted a hearing and reached a decision to accept his
application. By way of penalty, the 1991 reinstatement redesignated Gellene's partnership class,
depriving him of two years of seniority. Id. at 60-62.
250. Id. at 198-99, 301. Gellene's neglect resulted in a court ordered default judgment against South
Street and a loss of $19.9 million. In submissions to the court, Gellene falsely attributed the delay to a
conflict between Salovaara and Eckert. Id. at 301.
251. Id. at 37-42.
252. Id. at 57-59.
253. Id. at 63-70.
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defective character of individuals or the corruption of organizations. Attentive
to the complexities of individual and social psychology, he labors to appraise
Gellene's personality and character in light of the culture of Wall Street partner
tournaments, the norms of specialized practice fields, and the dynamics of deal
teams, here immersed in the Bucyrus bankruptcy. 2 54 In making this appraisal, he
observes that the culture and norms of each firm, each field, and each team vary
in accordance with the peculiar pressures, incentives, and temptations of the
situation. More disquieting, he likens Gellene's personality to the majority of
other corporate lawyers, noting the keen resemblance of traits and values.2 55
Ably drawing on the insights of organizational theory, Regan describes
Gellene's personality as well-suited to achieving tournament success in harshly
competitive law firm practice environments. By now, he remarks, these partner-
ship tournaments, specialized practice groups, and project teams dominate the
modern culture of large firms. In fact, Gellene's status anxiety, case hoarding,
and workload stress evince adaptive personality traits useful to professional life
in large law firms. These highly functional traits, Regan admits, suggest that
tournament survivors may be susceptible to strained moral rationalizations
made necessary to justify the troubling outcomes of changing firm and market
competitions.256 Contingent on the particularities of specific environments and
reward systems, the rationalizations deform the perception and resolution of
ethical issues.2 5 7 To the extent that the self-regarding norms of an invented
organizational culture produce such ethical deformity in lawyers and law firms,
they may be altered.
The alteration of the normative underpinnings of law firm tournament compe-
titions, specialty practice expectations, and project team dynamics requires both
the recollection and the intervention of other-regarding regulatory norms. The
norms apply equally to litigation advocacy and transactional counseling. Rooted
in traditional conceptions of legality and justice, they renew and reconstruct the
crucial linkages connecting client claims and goals to legal merit, thereby
recapturing the substantive logic of procedure and the intrinsic purpose of





254. Id. at 344-47.
255. Id. at 4-6.
256. Id. at 41-42.
257. See RICHARD SENNErr, THE CORROSION OF CHAR.ACER: THE PERSONAL CONSEQUENCES OF WORK IN
THE NEw CAPITAUSM 99, 116 (1998); Susan Daicoff, Lawyer Know Thyself: A Review of Empirical
Research on Attorney Attributes, Bearing on Professionalism, 46 Am. U. L. REv. 1337, 1423 (1997).
258. REGAN, supra note 1, at 272 (quoting Assistant U.S. Attorney Stephen Biskupic's closing
federal prosecution argument).
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The relative absence of other-regarding norms from risk management sys-
tems has not inhibited a growing revival of comparable regulatory norms within
large law firms. At its best, that revival infuses professionalism with moral
ambition and activism.2 5 9 Both ambition and activism may be seen unfolding in
the ongoing rise of firm ethics advisors and in-house corporate counselors.2 60
Charged with rebuilding the ethical infrastructure of law firms, these institu-
tional activists struggle to revise the boundaries of relevant ethical precepts and
to accommodate the new economics of law firm governance. 2 6 1 Goaded by calls
for law firm discipline 26 2 and the demands of corporate clients, their work
continues to redefine the modem law firm as a business organization.
Regan's interest in the behavior of business organizations drives his analysis
of large law firms and their changing regulatory culture. He treats modem law
firms as business enterprises wrestling to accommodate and resist powerful
market forces. Embattled by internal pressures and external forces, the firms
strive to function as self-conscious economic entities seeking to improve effi-
ciency and productivity, and to expand profits and market share.
Endeavoring to uphold ethical ideals against the onslaught of market exigen-
cies, Regan attempts to identify governance and regulatory measures capable of
fortifying the ethical infrastructure of law firm organization. The fortification of
firm infrastructure results from a blend of formal policies and informal cultural
norms. The key to this integration is compliance. For Regan, noteworthy
examples of firm compliance-enforcing procedures include the formation of
"new business" committees to review conflicts of interest generated by new
clients and new matters, the conditioning of attorney billing code assignments
on mandatory conflicts checks, the appointment of full-time in-house ethics
advisers supported by adequate partner and associate staffing, the establishment
of secondary partner review mechanisms for all firm-issued legal opinions, the
implementation of partner approval protocols for letters prepared in response to
client auditor information requests, the designation of in-house partner liaisons
to consult with firm malpractice insurance carriers, and the sponsorship of
interactive ethics training for lawyers and support staff.2 6 3
However lauditory these procedures, Regan concedes that they may prove
259. See Robert W. Gordon & William H. Simon, The Redemption of Professionalism?, in LAWYERS'
IDEALS/LAWYERS' PRACICES: TRANSFORMATIONS IN THE AMEcICAN LEGAL PROFESSION 230-57 (Robert L.
Nelson, David M. Trubek & Rayman L. Solomon eds., 1992).
260. See Robert L. Nelson & Laura Beth Nielsen, Cops, Counsel, and Entrepreneurs: Constructing
the Role of Inside Counsel in Large Corporations, 34 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 457, 490 (2000); Robert Eli
Rosen, The Inside Counsel Movement: Professional Judgment and Organizational Representation, 64
IND. L.J. 479 (1989).
261. See Elizabeth Chambliss, The Scope of In-Firm Privilege, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1721, 1758
(2005).
262. See Ted Schneyer, Professional Discipline for Law Firms?, 77 CORNELL L. REv. 1 (1991); see
also Julie Rose O'Sullivan, Professional Discipline for Law Firms? A Response to Professor Schneyer's
Proposal, 16 GEo. J. LEGAL ETmcs 1 (2002) (re-examining Professor Schneyer's argument for a
respondeat superior standard to assure law firm compliance with ethics standards).
263. REGAN, supra note 1, at 358-59.
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futile if adopted without instilling an organization-wide culture to reinforce
ethical behavior. 2 64 To fashion this culture, Regan looks to the practices of
corporate legal compliance. Research on corporate compliance, he notes, points
to the importance of organizational leadership (e.g., board directors and commit-
tees) in monitoring legal compliance. Effective monitoring requires resources,
access to information, and independent auditors both inside and outside the
organization. Monitoring also requires adequate supervision of practice groups,
teams, and positions vulnerable to unethical or illegal behavior. Supervision
bears great import for Regan. On his analysis, supervision promotes compliance
when it works to educate and train employees about ethics and legality, monitor
conduct through audits and certification, prevent efforts to shield management
from incriminating knowledge, foster upstream and downstream communica-
tion, safeguard employees designated to receive reports of unethical conduct,
and link compensation to compliance performance.2 6 5
Building an ethical infrastructure as a normative foundation to inculcate an
organizational ethos of compliance is critical to Regan's vision of the modern
law firm as a business enterprise.26 6 The inexorable cultural and economic
transformation of the Wall Street law firm prods Regan to consider both the
content and the context of corporate compliance programs. Regulated market
contexts, he observes, subject corporations to public oversight and discipline by
government bodies armed with specialized expertise and enforcement powers,
including federal criminal prosecution referrals. Outfitted with the authority to
impose civil and criminal liability, oversight agencies investigate statutory
violations, reporting the results under the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines,
and utilize compliance incentives, persuading corporations to avoid prosecution
or obtain lenient treatment. Adverting to the benefits of this regulatory context,
Regan notes the corporate development of programmatic compliance training
and supervision, and the institutionalization of corporate ethics staffs within
specific companies and across whole industries.26 7
Enlarging this contextual analysis, Regan analogizes the function of special-
ized law firm practice groups and task-differentiated corporate departments.
Like corporate departments, Regan explains, law firm practice groups operate in
accordance with rules promulgated by legislatures, administrative agencies, and
courts. By way of example, he cites the congressional formulation of standards
of conduct governing securities lawyers under the recent Sarbanes-Oxley legisla-
tion and the implementing rules of the Securities and Exchange Commission.
He also cites Internal Revenue Service regulations governing the conduct of
264. See id.; see also Harvey S. James Jr., Reinforcing Ethical Decision Making through Organiza-
tional Structure, 28 J. Bus. Emcs 43 (2000) (arguing that a formal organization structure, including
compensation practices, performance and evaluation systems, and decision-making assignments, is
necessary but not sufficient to promote ethical conduct).
265. REGAN, supra note 1, at 358-61.
266. Id. at 358.
267. Id. at 360.
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lawyers in providing tax advice and issuing tax shelter opinion letters. In fact,
he remarks, the regulatory promulgation of lawyers' ethical obligations extends
to the Office of Thrift Supervision and the Federal Home Loan Bank Board in
the field of banking, and to the Patent and Trademark Office in the field of
intellectual property.268
Regan approves the federal trend toward lawyer regulation by specialized
government bodies.2 69 Throughout he maintains that the assessment of lawyer
and law firm conduct requires contextual awareness of specific workplace
norms and practices. An awareness of the normative contests and practice
dynamics indigenous to certain fields of law and lawyering enables regulatory
entities to better grasp the categorical and discretionary obligations at hand in
resolving ethics disputes. That regulatory grasp, Regan opines, should produce
closely aligned street-level lawyer guidance. Accordingly, when forged by
well-versed entities out of collaborative dialogue with affected corporate and
legal actors, and cast to encapsulate the realism of particular practices among
corporations, industries, and global markets, such guidance is more likely to be
deemed fair and deserving of compliance.2 70
Regan supports this corporate compliance incentive thesis by utilitarian
reference to enhanced regulatory enforcement. Reasoning in the context of
corporate law practice, he contends that the designation of a public entity to
participate intimately in the regulation of lawyers within its field of expertise
countenances social concerns more effectively than an alternative bar disciplin-
ary system lacking such specialized knowledge. Extending this logic to law
firms, he emphasizes the importance of developing internal regulatory systems
responsive to the recurrent ethical issues common to specialized practice groups
and teams. The best practice systems (e.g., client databases, conflicts clearance
checks, and standardized billing guidelines) vest responsibility for compliance
measures and enforcement penalties in practitioner specialists working in coop-
eration with a firm-designated practice group ethics partner and a firm-wide
ethics committee. Patterned after corporate compliance teams, this ethics special-
ity team clutches the activist norms of organizational culture to promote regula-
tory compliance.27 1
Regan's focus on the centrality of organizational culture and ethos to both
corporate enterprises and corporate law firms is decisive. From this stance, he
declares "much of modem law practice is big business."27 2 To Regan, however,
that recognition counts only as "the first step in developing standards that offer
a realistic possibility of preserving the distinctive values of the legal profes-
268. See id. at 361-66.
269. Id. at 366.
270. Id. at 361.
271. Id. at 365-66. See generally DAVID P. McCAFFREY & DAVID W. HART, WALL STREET POLIcES
ITSELF: How SECuRmES FIRMs MANAGE TiHE LEGAL HAZARDS OF COMPETITIVE PRESsUREs (1998) (describ-
ing the methods securities firms use for self-regulation).
272. REGAN, supra note 1, at 366.
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sion." 2 7 3 Those distinctive values-accountability, legality, and justice-are
fundamental to reviving the traditional ambitions of professionalism. To flour-
ish, that revival must occur on more than an organizational plane. The revival
must affirm personal values274 and professional independence.27 5 It must reinvigo-
rate professionalism 276 and professional reputation 2 7 7 as aspirational norms
consistent with the lawyer's traditional problem-solving role in advancing
public justice in community-based contexts.27 8 A reinvigorated professionalism
celebrates integrity" and virtue,2o as well as positive law obligation.281 It
reasserts lawyers as moral agents with corresponding duties of candor and
honesty, duties desecrated by the contrived ignorance of Larry Lederman 28 2 and
273. Id.
274. See Mitchell M. Simon, Navigating Troubled Waters: Dealing with Personal Values when
Representing Others, 43 BRANDEIS L.J. 415 (2005) (developing a framework for incorporating indi-
vidual morality into daily legal choices).
275. See Robert W. Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U. L. REV. 1 (1988) (identifying
three aspects of independence and focusing on means of developing "autonomous social force");
Robert Eli Rosen, Problem-Setting and Serving the Organizational Client: Legal Diagnosis and
Professional Independence, 56 U. MtAMI L. REv. 179 (2001) (discussing the significance of problem
identification).
276. See Deborah L. Rhode, The Professionalism Problem, 39 WM. & MARY L. REv. 283, 315-25
(1998) (suggesting creative ways to strengthen professionalism).
277. See Milton C. Regan, Jr., Professional Reputation: Looking for the Good Lawyer, 39 S. Tx. L.
REv. 549 (1998) (discussing the importance of reputation for legal work).
278. See William H. Simon, Criminal Defenders and Community Justice: The Drug Court Example,
40 Am. CRIM. L. REv. 1595 (2003) (describing the role of community courts to strengthen legal
practice); William H. Simon & Charles F. Sabel, Destabilization Rights: How Public Law Litigation
Succeeds, 117 HARv. L. REV. 1015 (2004) (examining broader problem-solving role of lawyers in
institutional reform litigation); William H. Simon, Solving Problems vs. Claiming Rights: The Pragma-
tist Challenge to Legal Liberalism, 46 WM. & MARY L. REv. 127, 177-81 (2004) (discussing the
reinvigoration of lawyers' problem-solving role in relation to public concerns).
279. See Reed Elizabeth Loder, Integrity and Epistemic Passion, 77 NOTRE DAMfE L. REv. 841, 880
(2002) (highlighting integrity as applied to lawyers); David Luban, Integrity: Its Causes and Cures, 72
FoRDHAM L. REv. 279 (2003) (identifying ways self-deception hinders integrity); Deborah L. Rhode, If
Integrity is the Answer What is the Question?, 72 FoRDHAM L. REv. 333 (2003) (exploring ways to
inculcate integrity during professional training).
280. See Heidi Li Feldman, Codes and Virtues: Can Good Lawyers Be Good Ethical Deliberators?,
69 S. CAL. L. REV. 885 (1996) (applying virtue ethics to specific legal questions). See generally
ROSALIND HURSTHOUSE, ON VIRTUE ETHICs (1999) (developing a means to apply Aristotelian understand-
ing of virtue to contemporary choices); VIRTUE ETHIcs (Roger Crisp & Michael Slote, eds., 1997).
281. See William H. Simon, Should Lawyers Obey the Law?, 38 WM. & MARY L. REv. 217 (1996);
W. Bradley Wendel, Civil Obedience, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 363, 424 (2004) (arguing that lawyers have
an obligation to maintain a legitimate legal system); David B. Wilkins, In Defense of Law and
Morality: Why Lawyers Should Have a Prima Facie Duty to Obey the Law, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV.
269, 290 (1996) (noting lawyers' express commitment to obey the law).
282. See David Luban, Contrived Ignorance, 87 GEO. L.J. 957, 979 (1999) (arguing that lawyers
should generally avoid willful ignorance, especially in regard to corporate clients' efforts to enrich
themselves); William H. Simon, The Belated Decline of Literalism in Professional Responsibility
Doctrine: Soft Deception and the Rule of Law, 70 FORDHAM L. REv. 1881, 1881 (2002) (supporting the
decline of literalism in professional responsibility); W. Bradley Wendel, Professional Roles and Moral
Agency, 89 GEo. L.J. 667 (2001) (reviewing ARTHUR ISAK APPLBAUM, ETHICS FOR ADVERSARIES: THE
MORALITY OF ROLES IN PUBLIC AND PROFESSIONAL LIFE (1999)) (connecting ordinary moral considerations
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the lies of John Gellene.28 3 It also reclaims the values of honor and shame28 4
and the moral ideals of a heroic tradition.
The revival of a regulatory ethos extends to clients as well. This revival
reconfirms the client as a moral agent, 8 not merely as a vehicle for lawyer
whistle-blowing, 287 and as an active partner in corporate governance and account-
ability.2 8 8 Sparked by the increased regulation of corporate entities through
statutory incorporation of community norms, 2 8 9 such as Sarbanes-Oxley, 290 that
renewed spirit implicates directors and officers 291 working to implement the
and professional role prescriptions); see also David Luban, The Art of Honesty, 101 COLUM. L. REV.
1763, 1774 (2001) (describing lawyers' failure to distinguish facts from truth).
283. For discussion on lying and lawyering, see Thomas L. Shaffer, On Lying for Clients, 1 J. INST.
FOR STUDY LEGAL ETmcs 155, 175 (1996) (differentiating between morally acceptable and unacceptable
lies by lawyers) and William H. Simon, Virtuous Lying: A Critique of Quasi-Categorical Moralism, 12
GEO. J. LEGAL ETmIcs 433, 463 (1999) (arguing that lawyers' lies on behalf of their clients are only
justified when there is an important competing moral value).
284. See W. Bradley Wendel, Regulation of Lawyers Without the Code, the Rules, or the Restate-
ment: Or What Do Honor and Shame Have to Do with Civil Discovery Practice?, 71 FoRDHAM L. REV.
1567, 1569 (2003) (arguing for the use of honor as a restraint on legal practices).
285. See generally Rob Atkinson, Liberating Lawyers: Divergent Parallels in Intruder in the Dust
and To Kill a Mockingbird, 49 DuKE L.J. 601, 604-05 (1999) (contrasting the paternalistic ethics of
Atticus Finch and the more challenging ethics of Lucas Beauchamp); Constance Frisby Fain, Character-
istics of the Heroic Lawyer and Avoidance of Unprofessional Conduct, 13 WIDENER L.J. 61 (2003)
(describing how "heroic" lawyers benefit the profession); William H. Simon, Moral Icons: A Comment
on Steven Lubet's Reconstructing Atticus Finch, 97 MICH. L. REv. 1376, 1377 (1999) (endorsing an
understanding of Finch's morally complicated heroism); William H. Simon, Moral Pluck: Legal Ethics
in Popular Culture, 101 COLUM. L. REv. 421, 421 (2001) (tracing the theme of "moral pluck" through
John Grisham's novels, LA. Law, and The Practice); W. Bradley Wendel, Our Love-Hate Relationship
with Heroic Lawyers, 13 WIDENER L.J. 1 (2003) (noting that personal sacrifice is as important a quality
of legal heroism as courtroom skill).
286. See generally David B. Wilkins, Do Clients Have Ethical Obligations to Lawyers? Some
Lessons From the Diversity Wars, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL ETmics 855 (1998) (analyzing clients as independent
moral agents, particularly related to law firm diversity).
287. On the scope of disclosure and whistleblowing rules, see Richard W. Painter, Toward a Market
for Lawyer Disclosure Services: In Search of Optimal Whistleblowing Rules, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REv.
221 (1995).
288. See Donald C. Langevoort, The Human Nature of Corporate Boards: Law, Norms, and the
Unintended Consequences of Independence and Accountability, 89 GEO. L. J. 797, 805-17 (2001); see
also Report of the American Bar Association Task Force on Corporate Responsibility, March 31, 2003,
available at http://www.abanet.orgfbuslaw/corporateresponsibility/final-report.pdf (describing lawyer-
director cooperation in corporate governance).
289. For an analysis of norm integration in legal rules and regulations, see Susan P. Koniak &
George M. Cohen, In Hell There Will Be Lawyers Without Clients or Law, 30 HoFsTRA L. REv. 129
(2001) and Susan P. Koniak & George M. Cohen, When the Hurlyburly's Done: The Bar's Struggle with
the SEC, 103 CoLuM. L. REv. 1236 (2003).
290. For statutory provisions regarding attorneys and implementing regulations, see 15 U.S.C.A.
§§ 7202, 7245, 7262 (2005); 17 C.F.R. § 205.3 (2005). See also Roger C. Cramton et al., Legal and
Ethical Duties of Lawyers After Sarbanes-Oxley, 49 VILL. L. REv. 725 (2004); Lawrence A. Cunning-
ham, The Sarbanes-Oxley Yawn: Heavy Rhetoric, Light Reform (And It Might Just Work), 35 CONN. L.
REV. 915 (2003).
291. See H. Lowell Brown, The Corporate Director's Compliance Oversight Responsibility in the
Post-Caremark Era, 26 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 6 (2001) (discussing director and officer responsibility for
compliance programs); Lynne L. Dallas, A Preliminary Inquiry into the Responsibility of Corporations
and their Officers and Directors for an Ethical Corporate Climate: The Psychology of Enron's Demise,
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best practices of risk management for the purposes of regulatory compliance 2 9 2
and norm enforcement.2 93 In this sense, client moral agency may join with
lawyer self-regulation to combat fraud2 9 4 and mitigate corporate criminal liabil-
ity.295 Wide-ranging in form, client interventions may arise in the corporate
boardroom 296 or on the board audit committee.29 7
The multifaceted revival of professionalism in regulatory accountability car-
ries important consequences for legal education with respect to the teaching of
ethics and professional responsibility. Indeed, the revival offers an opportunity
to move beyond the formalist preoccupation with categorical rules and shift
analysis to the ethos of organizational culture. It also provides an opportunity to
construct new remedial interventions relevant to organizational entities and their
unique cultures, interventions rooted in moral discretion. To be sure, the revival
leaves more work to be done, for example in considering the place of racial
diversity and equality in law firm tournaments298 and the effect of racial
35 RUTGERS L.J. 1, 4 (2003) (discussing officer and director responsibility to disclose unethical
corporate culture).
292. See generally JEFFREY M. KAPLAN ET AL., COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS AND THE CORPORATE SENTENCING
GUIDELINES: PREVENTING CRIMINAL AND CIVIL LIABILIY (Supp. 2005) (providing guidelines for corporate
risk management and compliance programs).
293. See George H. Brown, Financial Institution Lawyers as Quasi-Public Enforcers, 7 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETmcs 637 (1994); John C. Coffee, Jr., Beyond the Shut-Eyed Sentry: Toward a Theoretical View
of Corporate Misconduct and an Effective Legal Response, 63 VA. L. REv. 1099 (1977); Cristie L. Ford,
Toward a New Model for Securities Law Enforcement, 57 ADMIN. L. REv. 757 (2005).
294. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The Client Fraud Problem as a Justinian Quartet: An Extended
Analysis, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1041, 1044 (1997) (discussing when a lawyer should interdict client
fraud); Donald Langevoort, Where Were the Lawyers? A Behavioral Inquiry into Lawyers'Responsibil-
ity for Clients' Fraud, 46 VAND. L. REv. 75, 78 (1993) (discussing lawyer ethical responsibilities in
relation to client fraud).
295. See generally Jennifer Arlen, The Potentially Perverse Effects of Corporate Criminal Liability,
23 J. LEG. STUD. 833 (1994) (analyzing corporate criminal liability and monitoring incentives); Jennifer
Arlen & Reinier Kraakman, Controlling Corporate Misconduct: An Analysis of Corporate Liability
Regimes, 72 N.Y.U. L. REv. 687 (1997) (reviewing duty-based corporate liability regimes); William S.
Laufer, Corporate Liability, Risk Shifting, and the Paradox of Compliance, 52 VAND. L. REv. 1343
(1999) (discussing how corporate liability is increasingly pushed onto corporate agents); Geraldine
Szott Moohr, An Enron Lesson: The Modest Role of Criminal Law in Preventing Corporate Crime, 55
FLA. L. REv. 937 (2003) (showing how criminal law failed to provide adequate deterrence); Dan K.
Webb et al., Understanding and Avoiding Corporate and Executive Criminal Liability, 49 Bus. LAW.
617 (1994) (outlining various steps to avoid criminal liability).
296. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Ethical Dilemmas of Corporate Counsel, 46 EMORY L.J. 1011,
1015 (1997) (analyzing a corporate lawyer's responsibility to bring compliance issues to the attention
of the board); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. & Edward B. Rock, A New Player in the Boardroom: The
Emergence of the Independent Directors' Counsel, 59 Bus. LAW. 1389, 1418 (2004) (analyzing the
ethical obligations of an independent lawyer-director).
297. See Lyman P.Q. Johnson, The Audit Committee's Ethical and Legal Responsibilities: The State
Law Perspective, 47 S. 'Ex. L. REv. 27, 28 (2005) (reviewing the ethical obligations of the board of
director's audit committee).
298. See David B. Wilkins, From "Separate Is Inherently Unequal" to "Diversity Is Good for
Business": The Rise of Market-Based Diversity Arguments and the Fate of the Black Corporate Bar,
117 HARv. L. REv. 1548 (2004).
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partisanship on the profession. 2 9 9 Likewise, it leaves more progress to be made
on issues of access to justice,30 pro bono responsibility, 301 and service in the
public interest.302 And yet, in the work of Regan and Simon, modest progress
has begun.
Here progress takes several forms. Statutory forms continue to emerge from
federal and state legislatures and related administrative agencies charged with
the promulgation, implementation, and enforcement of governing directives.
Regulatory forms likewise persist, arising out of national and state bar associa-
tions engaged in rule adoption and amendment, opinion drafting, and disciplin-
ary prosecutions. Juridical forms also carry on through federal and state court
review of bar rules and sanctions, and through independent court supervision of
misconduct-based civil and criminal prosecutions. Finally, educational forms of
progress continue to materialize in classroom and clinical settings where contex-
tual study, interdisciplinary instruction, and service-learning increasingly unfold
together.
CONCLUSION
For clinical ventures like the University of Miami Law School's Center for
Ethics & Public Service, the long progress ahead depends on gathering the
insights gleaned from the work of Regan and Simon, as well as Kronman,
Cover, Shaffer, and others, and then integrating those lessons into the mission of
educating law students and training lawyers and legal activists. Critically
instructive, their lessons help shape both the meaning and pedagogy of ethical
299. For historical background on racial partisanship in the legal profession, see generally David B.
Wilkins, A Systematic Response to Systemic Disadvantage: A Response to Sander, 57 STAN. L. REV.
1915 (2005); David B. Wilkins, On Being Good and Black, 112 HARv. L. REv. 1924 (1999) (reviewing
PAUL M. BARRETT, THE GOOD BLACK: A TRUE STORY OF RACE IN AMERICA (1999)); David B. Wilkins,
Partners Without Power? A Preliminary Look at Black Partners in Corporate Law Firms, 2 J. INST. FOR
STuDY LEGAL ETmcs 15 (1999); David B. Wilkins & G. Mitu Gulati, Reconceiving the Tournament of
Lawyers: Tracking, Seeding, and Information Control in the Internal Labor Markets of Elite Law
Firms, 84 VA. L. REv. 1581 (1998); David B. Wilkins & G. Mitu Gulati, Why Are There So Few Black
Lawyers in Corporate Law Firms? An Institutional Analysis, 84 CAL. L. REv. 493 (1996).
300. See generally Deborah L. Rhode, Access to Justice, 69 FoRDHAM L. REv. 1785 (2001)
(examining numerous failures that lead to unequal access to justice and proposing alternatives);
Deborah L. Rhode, Access to Justice: Again, Still, 73 FORDHAM L. REv. 1013 (2004) (same); Deborah L.
Rhode, Defining the Challenges of Professionalism: Access to Law and Accountability of Lawyers, 54
S.C. L. REV. 889 (2003) (examining the challenges facing the enlargement of lawyer professionalism).
301. Compare Deborah L. Rhode, Cultures of Commitment: Pro Bono for Lawyers and Law
Students, 67 FoRDHAM L. REV. 2415, 2418 (1999) (considering strategies to improve the "culture of
commitment" to pro bono work), with Rob Atkinson, A Social-Democratic Critique of Pro Bono
Publico Representation of the Poor: The Good as the Enemy of the Best, 9 Am. U.J. GENDER Soc. POL'Y
& L. 129, 131 (2001) (arguing that an expanded system of tax-funded lawyers would be the best means
to provide legal services to the poor).
302. See Debra Lyn Bassett, Redefining the "Public" Profession, 36 RUTGERs L.J. 721 (2005);
Robert W. Gordon, Private Career-Building and Public Benefits: Reflections on "Doing Well By Doing
Good," 41 Hous. L. REv. 113 (2004); David B. Wilkins, Doing Well By Doing Good? The Role of
Public Service in the Careers of Black Corporate Lawyers, 41 Hous. L. Rev. 1 (2004); Deborah L.
Rhode, The Profession and the Public Interest, 54 STAN. L. REv. 1501 (2002) (book review).
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judgment. Inexorably, the meaning of ethical judgment must turn multidimen-
sional, drawing on legal, philosophical, and theological elements. In the same
way, the pedagogy of ethical judgment inevitably must stand multipronged,
resting on traditional, simulated, and clinical methods of teaching. For the
purposes of ascertaining the meaning of and developing a pedagogy of ethical
judgments, all the normative categories surveyed here-classical, risk-
management, discretionary, and regulatory-will prove useful. This task will
begin with the hard work of mentoring at law school. 303
Due in part to Regan and Simon, the form and content of law student and
young lawyer mentoring must change to more fully account for the influence of
organizational culture and the place of moral discretion in ethical decisionmak-
ing. Last fall when I declared risk management triumphant in class, I tried to
convey the profound shift in the profession signified by the rising norms and
narratives of lawyer malpractice, loss prevention, and professional liability. Yet,
struck by the profound alteration of the profession, my students misapprehended
the regulatory lesson at stake.
In the same way, lawyers and law firms mistake the import of growing public
regulation. The lesson is not to abandon professional ambitions and traditions in
favor of risk management norms and procedures, or worse, to take advantage of
opportunities for morally risk-taking behavior implanted in the ambiguity of
governing norms and procedures. Rather, the lesson is to integrate risk manage-
ment norms into the best traditions and highest ambitions of the profession.
Somehow my students mistook that lesson.
Both lawyers and law teachers too often make the same mistake. For Shaffer,
this error comes out of the failure to insist that professional responsibility is
ultimately about ethics." Gauging this error, Shaffer urges law teachers to "try
to find a way to focus on what ethics is before we get very far into the rules."3 05
In this way, he adds, "one can eventually get into risk management, and perhaps
one should, but it would be mostly irony." 30 6 Nonetheless, Shaffer cautions
against operating from "instinctive and cultural moral judgment." 30 7 Instead, he
prods law teachers "to get at 'the meaning and pedagogy of ethical judg-
ment."'
308
To be of use to law students and young lawyers, the lessons of ethical
judgment and moral integration must be couched in the realities of modern
303. See Michael P. Allen, Can Actions Teach Louder Than Words: The Role of Mentoring and
Modeling in Teaching Professional Ethics: An Introduction (and a Confession), 14 WIDENER L.J. 323,
328 (2005); Thomas L. Shaffer, On Teaching Legal Ethics with Stories About Clients, 39 Wm. & MARY
L. REV. 421, 422-23 (1998); W. Bradley Wendel, Teaching Ethics in an Atmosphere of Skepticism and
Relativism, 36 U.S.F. L. REV. 711, 713-14 (2002).
304. See Letter from Thomas L. Shaffer, Robert and Marion Short Professor of Law Emeritus, Notre
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practice. The large law firm stands atop the organization of modem practice at
the intersection of character and culture. Regan traces contemporary ethical
challenges to the cultural tensions arising from the habits of law firm tourna-
ments, specialized practice groups, and project teams. Simon discerns the
discretionary judgments embedded in the case and client-specific strategic
decisions made daily within those practice groups and deal teams. For the
moment, neither Regan nor Simon provides much concrete guidance in map-
ping the reintegration of discretionary and regulatory norms into the everyday
practices of litigation and transactional deal-making. Teaching Simon's concep-
tion of moral discretion to law students and Regan's notion of regulatory ethos
to lawyers are good places to start.

